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ABSTRACT 
 
 Fiji has been noted for its problems with racial tensions.  Previous analyses have 
focused on the role of the Fijian elite in propagating racial tensions against the Indo-
Fijian community.  Therefore, this thesis endeavoured to find out, how do ordinary 
Fijians feel about ethno-nationalism?  Are they active players in spreading such 
sentiments?  The study placed increased focus on eastern Fijians, given that their elite 
had their power entrenched at Cession.  This examination found that while stereotypes 
and biases that are ethno-nationalistic in nature do exist, eastern Fijians want other 
challenges to be addressed.  More specifically, poverty and gender issues are two 
concerns requiring attention.  Modernization has increased poverty, as many Fijians lack 
the skills to access better paying jobs.  The Fijian culture plays a big role here, as it 
encourages ordinary Fijians to view education suspiciously.  Furthermore, cultural 
emphasis on rank and patriarchy makes Fijians, including women, subservient to those 
with higher status.  This means that problems such as violence against women are 
prevalent.  NGOs are involved in trying to address these concerns, although with limited 
success.  NGOs and ordinary Fijians conflict in how best to deal with poverty.  NGOs 
argue that changes at the political level will help decrease poverty.  On the other hand, 
the Fijian grassroots want direct measures to help them overcome their plight.  With 
gender issues, women’s NGOs are more successful, as their work also gives direct 
attention to Fijian women.  This is highlighted by the fact that more Fijian women are 
speaking out against their plight.  This study is significant because it shows that ordinary 
Fijians are not active players in the promotion of ethno-nationalism. Instead, other 
actors, such as the Fijian elite and NGOs, are involved in ethno-nationalistic disputes. 
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Introductory Chapter 
 
Introduction and Objectives  
 The colonization of Fiji by Great Britain in 1874, which was formalized with the 
signing of the Deed of Cession, ushered in a new era for indigenous Fijians.  One aim of 
colonization was to protect the traditional lifestyle of the indigenous Fijians so they 
would not experience the plight experienced by indigenous peoples in other colonies.1   
At the same time, colonization also endeavoured to enlighten indigenous Fijians by 
converting them to Christianity.2  However, several colonial initiatives were introduced 
that had, and continue to have, a negative impact on the Fijian grassroots.  The Fijian 
elite is comprised of political leaders, high ranking military officers, senior public 
servants, and crucially, the chiefs anchored in Fijian traditions.  Grassroots refers to 
ordinary Fijians who lack high socio-economic status, and who are not recognized as 
having chiefly rank.   
 The first significant development that took place during colonialism was that the 
eastern chiefs were allowed to consolidate their power over all of Fiji, including over the 
western people.  This meant that the patriarchal system of the east, which placed a great 
deal of power in the hands of the chiefs, was entrenched.  Western Fijians became 
subservient to the power of colonially supported eastern chiefs.  The westerners, who 
were far more egalitarian than their eastern counterparts, lacked a matching confederacy 
                                                 
1 Stephanie Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
58. 
2 R. A. Derrick, A History of Fiji, Vol. I. (Suva: Government Press, 1968), Appendix- Deed of Cession, I. 
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of their own, allowing the eastern confederacies to gain favour with the colonial 
authorities.  Confederacies reflect the hierarchical and expansive nature of pre-colonial 
Polynesian influence,3 while also illustrating territorial divisions based on past warfare.4  
Confederation status is advantageous because it allows the elite of this extended unit to 
voice the concerns of the social and cultural group in a stronger fashion.  It should be 
noted that western tribes, influenced by the Melanesian culture, did not establish a 
confederacy of their own because they were not as expansive and hierarchical. Wars 
conducted by pre-colonial western tribes were carried out either for retribution for past 
wrongs to a tribe, or to gain respect for the Big-man of the tribe.5   
 Another key colonial initiative was the introduction of Indians into Fiji. They 
were brought from the Indian sub-continent in the late 1870s as indentured labourers to 
work on the sugar plantations.  This led to the colonial authorities strongly enforcing the 
policy of Divide and Rule,6 where indigenous Fijians (henceforth referred to as Fijians) 
were effectively isolated from the Indians (from now on referred to as Indo-Fijians) to 
maintain order in the colony and preserve the traditional way of life of the Fijians.  Thus, 
Fijians lived a sheltered and communal lifestyle in isolated, traditional rural villages. 
After the end of their indenture period, Indo-Fijians established themselves either as 
small-scale sugarcane farmers on leased Fijian land or entered the trade and commerce 
                                                 
3 Expansion refers to the quest by various eastern confederacies to gain control over more territory, power, 
and wealth.   
4 The confederacies (all from the east) that have been officially recognized since the colonial period are 
the Tovata, the Burebasaga, and the Kubuna. 
5 Michael C. Howard, Nii-K. Plange, Simione Durutalo, and Ron Witton, The Political Economy of the 
South Pacific, (Australia: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1983), 39.   
It should be noted that the Big-man can be somewhat compared to the Chief of the Polynesian Tribe, 
although the Big-man did not possess the power of an Eastern Chief because Melanesian society was more 
egalitarian.  
6As will be discussed more in-depth later, the colonial authorities gave the chiefs responsibility to 
maintain law and order amongst Fijians through the policy of Indirect Rule.   This policy solidified and 
entrenched the power and control of the chiefs in Fiji. 
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industries.7  Consequentially, Fiji became deeply divided between two contrasting 
peoples and cultures.  
 Since independence in 1970, three coups have taken place, two in 1987 and one 
in 2000.  All three coups saw the political, official and military Fijian elites mobilizing 
Fijian commoners to support the overthrow of Indo-Fijian dominated governments.  
These coups were justified by the Fijian elite as necessary in order to stop the perceived 
threat posed by the Indo-Fijians to the Fijian culture.  Consequentially, ethnic relations 
between the two communities deteriorated markedly.   
 Leading academics in the field have intensively analyzed ethnic tensions in Fiji 
from diverse viewpoints and with differing interpretations.  However, many of these 
explanations present incomplete interpretations of the phenomenon, as they do not 
examine what role the Fijian grassroots play in the promotion of ethno-nationalism.  
They all discuss ethnic tensions in terms of elite responses to the subject.   
 Some leading academics argue that Fijian commoners are submissive to the 
wishes of the Fijian elite because of elite claims to traditional authority.  For example, 
Brij V. Lal (1986) has suggested that Fijian commoners equally share the views 
articulated by the elite.   He implies that these beliefs have led to ethnic polarisation, 
highlighted in the political struggles between Fijians and Indo-Fijians.  R.S. Milne 
(1981) has also looked at the influence of the traditional structure on the Fijian 
grassroots.  His view of Fiji as a bipolar society also assumes that the views of ordinary 
Fijians are the same as those of the Fijian elite.  Isireli Lasaqa’s (1984) analysis is also 
                                                 
7 The indenture system was terminated in 1916-1917 after much pressure from Indo-Fijian leaders, which 
exacerbated the level of ethnic tension in Fiji.  Furthermore, the Indo-Fijians eventually came to form 
more than half of the country’s population, which also contributed to heightened ethnic tensions in the 
colony. 
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within this stream because his work portrays the Fijian grassroots as being completely 
submissive to the wishes of the Fijian elite. While he gives the reader an important 
insight into Fijian life and values, his reasoning follows the traditional viewpoint that 
Fijians completely favour a traditional, rural-based lifestyle, in contrast to Indo-Fijians 
who favour an individualistic and urban-based lifestyle.  
 A second interpretation posits that ethno-nationalism is class-based.  Michael 
Howard (1991) suggests Fiji is embroiled in class conflict whereby the Fijian elite form 
a core component of the dominant class, and act in ways that allow them to maintain 
their power.  This analysis portrays the Fijian grassroots as being prevented from rising 
up in their socio-economic status by the Fijian elite.  The basic premise is that the Fijian 
elite have resisted any threats to their power.  For example, he argues that Prime 
Minister Bavadra, himself an ordinary Fijian from the west (though claiming to be of 
chiefly status), was overthrown because the Fijian elite, including the eastern chiefs, saw 
him as a threat to their authority.  The analysis is indeed innovative.  However, his 
argument is problematic because his analysis does not fully explain inter-ethnic 
relations, including the response of the Fijian grassroots to the ethnic divide.  Robertson 
and Sutherland’s (2003) analysis of the 2000 coup follows the same line of reasoning as 
Howard, arguing that ethnic tensions are the result of the Fijian elite’s desire to maintain 
their position and privilege.  Like Howard, their analysis is incomplete because it does 
not describe the response of the Fijian grassroots to the ethnic divide.  The basic 
problem in both of these studies is that the views of the Fijian grassroots have been 
neglected because their voices and opinions are not heard.  On the other hand, the Fijian 
elite voice their opinions on the issues continuously.  This means that the opinions of the 
Fijian elite are more readily documented and analyzed.  
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 Third, some leading academics make the assumption that ethno-nationalistic 
sentiments held by the Fijian elite are inter-changeable with those of ordinary Fijians.  
For example Premdas (1991, 1993, 1995), as well as Premdas and Steeves (1991, 1993, 
1995), have focused on ethnic tensions in relation to the constitutional and political 
changes made by the Fijian elite.  Robertson and Tamanisau’s (1988) analysis is also 
problematic because they too discuss ethno-nationalism in terms of the constitutional 
and political changes made by the Fijian elite.  The main problem posed by these studies 
is that the Fijian grassroots may not agree with elite responses to ethnic tension. 
 The above critiques are not meant to denigrate the work of leading academics on 
the issue, because they have made strong contributions in trying to explain what is 
occurring in Fiji.  However, their interpretations imply that the Fijian grassroots do not 
really have any other concerns beyond that of culture.  This thesis suggests that while 
ordinary Fijians may harbour certain stereotypes that are ethno-nationalistic in nature, 
there are other challenges that they feel need more attention.  This is why focusing on 
the grassroots is essential given that prevailing academic interpretations of ethnic 
interaction focus on the elite.   
 Therefore, this study has endeavoured to fill this gap because it is necessary to 
see how the Fijian grassroots feel about ethno-nationalism, and whether or not this 
phenomenon is their primary preoccupation.  This study has focused on three main 
areas.  One area concerns the influence of the colonial legacy on the attitudes and values 
of the Fijian grassroots, and if that legacy continues to have an effect today.   A second 
area revolves around the attitudes of Fijian commoners, and whether or not they are 
active players in the promotion of ethno-nationalism.  A third area of analysis is the role 
of some of the relevant non-governmental organizations (now to be referred to as 
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NGO’s) operating in Fiji, and whether or not their activities have had any influence on 
the attitudes of the Fijian grassroots. 
 It should be noted that this study has placed more attention on eastern Fijian 
commoners.  The rationale for this is simple.  Many scholars have acknowledged the 
central role of Fijian chiefs in using ethnic appeals and sentiments to sustain their 
political authority.  Although Fijians have, on occasion, supported their chiefs when 
appeals to ethnic solidarity have been utilized by chiefs, how do Fijians view ethno-
nationalism?  Is it the driving force of their lives? 
 In the course of conducting this study, the central contention is that while 
stereotypes and biases exist at the grassroots level, there are other challenges that the 
Fijian grassroots (especially those from the east) face, and ones they want addressed.  
More specifically, eastern Fijians are concerned about the deteriorating quality of life, 
especially their struggles with poverty.  While there are some Fijians that idealize many 
aspects of traditional life, more are complaining that their poor quality of life prevents 
them from progressing.  There are several reasons for why the Fijian grassroots endure 
such a poor quality of life.  One reason for this is that the traditional way of life has held 
most Fijians back, as they have been forced to accept decisions made for them by the 
Fijian elite.  Traditional Fijian society, especially eastern Fijian society, has enforced the 
view that those of rank are to make the important decisions since they possess more 
knowledge than the Fijian grassroots.  As a result, ordinary Fijians have not been able to 
attain the necessary skills and capacities to fully participate in society.  This means that 
when frustrations arise, Fijians have been taught by the Fijian elite that their problems 
can be traced to the Indo-Fijians. Thus, many misperceptions of Indo-Fijians continue to 
prevail.  For example, it is believed that Indo-Fijians are wealthier than Fijians.  
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Additionally, Fijians have been taught that the Indo-Fijian threat to the Fijian culture 
remains pervasive.  As will be highlighted in the study, a number of constraints, 
especially the lack of skills, make it difficult for Fijians to progress.  Moreover, there are 
strong sentiments by eastern Fijians that their quality of life must improve.  
Central Variables  
 One challenge from the outset is to gain an understanding of the traditional 
structure of authority that binds ordinary Fijians.  Therefore, our analysis requires a 
basic knowledge of traditional Fijian society and the social hierarchy that has been 
established. The basic social hierarchy of Fijian society includes (in ascending order): 
the i tokatoka (extended family), the mataqali (the family group), the yavusa (the clan), 
and the vanua (a group of yavusa).8  Within this framework, the chiefs are the highest 
levels of authority to whom commoners give their unconditional allegiance and loyalty. 
The chiefs are an autocratic elite responsible for the survival (in the vaguest sense of the 
term) of their people.9  This structure of authority, which places importance on status 
and rank, has made ordinary Fijians subservient to the will of the chiefs.  For example, 
chiefs can alienate the most valuable property within the communal holdings for their 
own purposes. Additionally, they determine what land can be taken from the collective 
holding and how much can be allocated to individuals. They can also determine what 
shall be produced on the communal land and how it is to be consumed and marketed.10  
This is why Fijian society has been labelled as a Culture of Silence because, in addition 
                                                 
8 Isireli Lasaqa, The Fijian People: Before and After Independence, 1959-1977, (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1984), 18. 
9 O.H.K. Spate, The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects, (Suva: Government Press, 1959), 
5-7. 
10 W.P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 8. 
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to unconditionally obeying their superiors (including their chiefs), Fijians are expected 
not to challenge the wisdom of their allocative decisions.     
 The traditional structure also considers land to be an important part of the lives 
of Fijians.  Fijians were, and continue to be, encouraged to live off the land and engage 
in subsistence agriculture for their survival.  The Spate Report of 1959 highlighted that 
the Fijian elite argued that land was crucial for Fijians because it unified the people.11  
This is why Fijians are encouraged to live in rural villages, because it is believed that it 
helps reinforce their values and way of life.  The Fijian elite also continues to preach the 
importance of maintaining the paramountcy of the Fijian culture because it helps protect 
Fijian land.  This has led to tensions with regards to land tenure between Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians.  Land is a source of division because Indo-Fijians argue that they need 
access to more land for leasing purposes, and more security of leasing provisions.  On 
the other hand, the Fijian elite argue that the Indo-Fijians want to deprive the Fijian 
people of their land. More specifically, the Fijian elite say that Indo-Fijians want to 
deprive Fijians of the protections of Fijian paramountcy, entrenched under the Deed of 
Cession.12   
The colonial period also saw the codification of Fijian land based on the 
mataqali system. While it was argued that the mataqali system standardized the way 
land was divided, what it did was impose the eastern system on Fiji.  The system of 
landholding is communal, meaning that the community prevails over the individual in 
importance, and individuals have obligations and responsibilities to the community.13  
                                                 
11 O.H.K. Spate, The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects, 5. 
12 It should be noted that the three Constitutions passed after independence continue to protect the 
paramountcy of the Fijian culture as well. 
13 O.H.K. Spate, The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects, 11. 
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However, the mataqali system also has other distinctive features. For example, each 
mataqali is in charge of its own land, which means that each respective mataqali 
independently divides land amongst its members for things such as gardens.14  It is 
inconceivable for mataqali land to ever fall into the hands of non-Fijians if restrictive 
conditions are imposed. Therefore, if members of another race are to have access to 
Fijian land, it can only be on the basis of a temporary arrangement.  Additionally, these 
‘strangers’ must compensate the Fijian landowners for its use.  Fijians have an extremely 
strong identification with mataqali land because it forms the soul of the Fijian race. 
 Overview 
 The first chapter analyzes the historical background with the focus being placed 
on the evolution of attitudes towards ethnic accommodation and the Fijian culture.  
Overall, this chapter identifies the problems created by colonialism, including the 
creation of various institutions that have given rise to ethnic tensions between Fijians 
and Indo-Fijians.  This chapter also puts into context why the policy of Divide and Rule 
was established, and how the Fijian elite fit into this policy.    
 The second chapter deals with elite participation in ethnic conflict.  This chapter 
asks the following questions: First, what accommodative framework has been 
developed by the elite in the period after independence?  More specifically, what kind 
of racial categories have been created by the Fijian elite?  This chapter discusses the 
various issues raised by the Fijian elite as being important for the survival of the Fijian 
people.  Furthermore, there will be an analysis of how the elite have used the various 
institutions inherited from the colonial period to serve their own self-interests.  There 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 8. 
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will also be a discussion of the role that the 1987 and 2000 coups played in the 
development of this framework. 
 The third chapter deals with the response of eastern Fijians to ethnic conflict and 
other crucial issues that affect them.  The following questions are addressed in this 
chapter: First, what phenomenon is going on at the grassroots level?  And second, is 
ethno-nationalism felt as strongly at the grassroots level as at the elite level?  This 
chapter will also deal with the role that NGOs play in this phenomenon.   
Methodology 
 In examining the dynamics of ethnic accommodation in Fiji, the study utilizes 
empirical and historical methodologies.  This study is based on qualitative analysis, as 
opposed to quantitative analysis, and thus employs the typical methods used in 
qualitative research.  The study included a textual analysis of written materials such as 
journal articles, books and government documents.  Other relevant documents such as 
United Nations documents, documents from NGOs, and newspaper articles were also 
consulted. 
 The study draws on both primary and secondary sources.  Primary sources 
include reports from NGO’s, the United Nations, relevant civil society organizations, 
and Government sources. Secondary sources, including books and journal articles, were 
relied upon as well in the analysis of ethnic accommodation and conflict.   
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Chapter One- Historical Preconditions for Analysis 
Introduction 
 The problems that Fiji faces today are not just due to the results of events and 
crises that have occurred recently.  The predicament that the country currently finds 
itself in has its roots in past events including the institutional structure put into place 
after Fiji became a British colony.   
 Well before colonization, Fiji was mainly populated by Melanesian peoples.  
Invasions by the Tongans introduced the Polynesian culture to the area.15  What this 
meant was that there were two main cultural influences in the area.  The western 
Melanesian culture, more prevalent in the western and central parts of the island of Viti 
Levu, emphasized a more egalitarian culture.  Amongst other things, this meant that 
limited chiefly power was emphasized.16   The Polynesian influence, more prevalent in 
the eastern part of Vitu Levu and the island of Vanua Levu, as well as the other 
surrounding islands, emphasized a more rigid, paternalistic and hierarchical culture.  
Amongst other things, this meant that chiefs held power and authority over 
commoners.17       
 
                                                 
15 R. A. Derrick, A History of Fiji, Vol. I. (Suva: Government Press, 1968), 2. 
16 Ibid. 2-4. 
17 Ibid. 2-4. 
 12
European involvement in Fiji began in the early 19th century, when shipwrecked traders 
observed that the area was full of valuable sandalwood.18  After sandalwood stocks were 
depleted, other goods such as bêche-de-mer were heavily sought by European traders.19  
European penetration into the area had two major consequences. Europeans introduced 
western goods such as guns and other hardware into the area. Warfare between various 
tribes became much more dangerous than before.  Whoever possessed these new 
weapons could expand much more easily.  European traders dealt more with the eastern 
Fijians, meaning that their chiefs were able to use such weapons to expand their power, 
wealth, and territory.20  Contact with Europeans also signalled the introduction of the 
influence of European values on Fijians.21  Mission societies spread the Christian faith 
widely among Fijians and the basic elements of a new capitalist economy began to take 
root. The churches reinforced the basis of chiefly authority. Chiefs now had access to a 
money income as they were incorporated into the colonial administration. Both 
Christianity and the money economy furthered chiefly status and privilege in the 
territory.   
 The Cession of Fiji to the British by the high chiefs of eastern Fiji in 1874 
institutionalized their position over all Fijians allowing them to secure their power 
within the colony.22  However, colonization also had some other lasting impacts 
including the introduction of Indians as indentured labour and the entrenchment of the 
idea of the `paramountcy’ of the Fijian people and culture.  It was believed that only by 
                                                 
18 Adrian C. Mayer, Indians in Fiji, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 7. 
19 Michael C. Howard et al The Political Economy of the South Pacific, 71. 
20 Ibid. 90. 
21 Thomas Williams, Fiji and the Fijians: The Islands and their Inhabitants, Vol. I. Ed. George Stringer 
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actively segregating Fijians, Indo-Fijians and Europeans would law, order, and peace be 
maintained in the colony.  However, this initiative only created false images of one 
another, especially between Fijians and Indo-Fijians.  This produced a high level of 
tension between the groups, and laid the foundation for problems seen today.   
British Colonial Authorities 
 The actions and ideas of the first Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, laid the 
groundwork for the principles that continue to be observed today.  One of Gordon’s 
primary objectives was to safeguard Fijian interests from the evils of western 
penetration, including the European planters looking for cheap labourers to work on 
their sugar plantations.  Gordon was greatly motivated by the actions of settlers in New 
Zealand, who effectively displaced the Maori by taking over their land.23  As a result, 
one of his key initiatives was to re-structure the social modes of control to keep order 
and stability in Fiji.24   This meant that preserving the doctrine of the paramountcy of 
Fijian interests, implied in the Deed of Cession, was of the utmost importance.  
Therefore, one measure taken was to make the land the inalienable property of the Fijian 
people.25  However, Europeans had alienated some land prior to Cession.  Therefore, the 
Native Lands Commission (NLC) was established in 1880 to look into, and decide on, 
the validity of such claims.  After the Commission finished its work approximately fifty 
years later, roughly 83% of land (since then increased with the transfer of some Crown 
land to the Fijians) was deemed to belong to the Fijian people, and was thus 
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inalienable.26  The other parcels of land were deemed to be either freehold or Crown 
land.  Indo-Fijians could not own land in Fiji.   
 Gordon also introduced the policy of Divide and Rule, of which indirect rule was 
a major portion of this policy.  Divide and Rule maintained segregation between the 
various groups living in Fiji.  A major consequence of this was that it would help to 
create and foster many misperceptions between the various groups.  Divide and Rule 
conformed to the following hierarchical structure.  God was above all else; the Queen 
(portrayed as giving the land to the Fijians) was next in the hierarchy; the Governor was 
the next in the chain of command.27  With respect to the Fijian people, the eastern chiefs, 
whose power was seen as being derived from those higher up in the hierarchy, were next 
in command.28  Indirect Rule, based on experiments conducted in Africa and Asia, gave 
the eastern chiefs the primary responsibility of ensuring that law and order was 
maintained in Fijian areas.29  It was argued that this framework would preserve the 
traditional life of the Fijian people.  This policy included the creation of institutions such 
as the Great Council of Chiefs (the GCC) and the Native Regulations Board (NRB) to 
help govern the Fijian people (though all subject to the authority of the colonial 
government).  The role of these institutions, as well as the specific role of the chiefs will 
be discussed later in the chapter.  The British colonial authorities, in collaboration with 
the eastern chiefs, also codified traditional Fijian values to be used by the chiefs to 
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enforce indirect rule.30  These values included eastern Fijian ideas, as these were 
regarded as superior by the British because their system mirrored the ideal, hierarchical 
system.31  Western, Melanesian-influenced ideas were anything but ideal according to 
the British, as they felt that Melanesian beliefs did not have the hierarchical structure to 
unite the Fijian people.32  However, it should be noted that the values codified as 
traditional were those that correlated with British principles, including those of a natural 
hierarchy and of the Christian religion.33   
 Another initiative taken by Governor Gordon was the introduction of Indian 
indentured labourers in Fiji.  This scheme was the result of the economic policy that the 
colonial authorities envisioned to make Fiji self-sufficient.  After Cession, the British 
encouraged The Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) of Australia to monopolize 
sugar production because other European plantations operating in Fiji were either failing 
or were seen as too small to have any impact.34  The company eventually agreed to start 
operations in Fiji, but demanded a stable source of cheap labour to begin operations.  
The colonial government, as well as the eastern chiefs, did not want Fijians to work on 
the plantations and disrupt their “traditional” way of life.35  Additionally, it was more 
difficult and expensive to bring in indentures from the other Pacific Islands.36  The 
solution reached was to bring in Indians from India as indentured labourers who signed 
five-year contracts to work on the plantations.  Various experiments had been held in the 
British Empire to find the best indentured workers, and Indians were deemed better 
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labourers because they were regarded as being healthier, as having relatively better 
physique, as being easy to recruit, and more importantly, as being more obedient.37  The 
colonial authorities and the eastern chiefs initially did not regard the Indians as a threat 
to their power and privilege because it was assumed that if the Indians stayed after the 
end of their indenture contracts, they would amount to nothing more than agricultural 
labourers.38  At the on-set of the indenture period, the colonial authorities (in 
collaboration with the eastern chiefs) extended the policy of Divide and Rule to include 
segregation between Fijians and Indo-Fijians, as a way to keep order in the colony. The 
Fijians were governed through indirect rule, which gave the chiefs the primary 
responsibility over the Fijian people though subject to colonial authority.  Additionally, 
Fijians were given the right to their own system of customary law, including their own 
courts, judges and administrators.39   
On the other hand, the Indo-Fijians were placed under the sole control of the 
colonial government.40  The British (encouraged by the eastern chiefs) also forbade the 
Indo-Fijians from living in Fijian villages in order to ensure that the two groups were 
separated.41  And in the few cases during the indenture period where Fijians worked as 
plantation labourers, Fijians and Indo-Fijians were housed separately and each had 
different contractual arrangements.42  Additionally, the Indo-Fijians were not extended 
the same privileges as the Fijian people, including the right to their own customary law 
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and systems.43  This separate and unequal treatment increased resentment amongst the 
Indo-Fijians, as they felt excluded and discriminated against by the colonial authorities.  
As will be discussed later, protests would be made by the growing Indo-Fijian 
population and would be seen as a threat by the colonial authorities and eastern chiefs 
with regards to their power and privileges.  
Christian Missionaries  
 The influence of Christian missionaries, and the message of Christianity, would 
also have a strong impact on Fijian values and attitudes.  Prior to conversion, Fijians 
were regarded as lacking the ability to contemplate anything natural.44  However, they 
were regarded as admiring some aspects of human life, such as those of cleverness, and 
reacting to abnormal activities.45  What was regarded as Fijian religion prior to the 
adoption of Christianity was complex.  Many ceremonies had supernatural backgrounds, 
as Fijians believed in the presence of many gods and spirits, who were held to influence 
any unexplained phenomena.46  These gods and spirits would be called upon to help with 
the undertaking of various tasks, including success in war and deliverance from 
sickness.47  Therefore, magic was considered to be very important, meaning that only 
persons of intelligence and rank were given the responsibility of carrying out the rituals 
to invoke these gods and spirits.48   
There were three types of uses of magic prior to contact: 1-black magic, which 
produced death, disease and bad luck (utilized in times of war); 2- specialized/beneficent 
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magic of departmental experts, which was very important for economic purposes such as 
warding off crises like drought; and 3- private magic used by ordinary people in 
everyday life.49  The first two instances were carried out in times of crisis, usually in the 
village temple (called bure kalou).50  Every village had at least one such temple, though 
they were used only in times of crisis.51  The overall impression missionaries had of the 
Fijian “religion” was that Fijians were more superstitious than religious.52  While 
missionaries inferred that there was no “national” god, because no single Fijian nation 
existed, they also recognized that Fijians engaged in some forms of worship.  While all 
Fijians believed in local gods,53 as spirits of renowned ancestors, eastern Fijians had 
stronger beliefs in the supernatural qualities of their chiefs.54   Thus, Fijians gave their 
chiefs deeper allegiance, fearing that angering them would result in negative 
consequences, including those of a supernatural quality.55  Therefore, hierarchy was 
more important in the eastern parts (where there was greater Polynesian influence) than 
in the western parts, (where there was a greater Melanesian influence).   
 While both groups were labelled as barbaric, missionaries classified the groups 
in terms of who could be converted more easily based on the following rationale.56  
They believed that people could be converted to Christianity only if their culture’s 
hierarchical structure was strong.57  Missionaries determined that converting the western 
Fijians, who were influenced by Melanesian ideals, would be difficult because their 
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social structure was not hierarchical. 58  Additionally, missionaries reasoned that the 
beliefs of the westerners were too diversified because they primarily engaged in ancestor 
worship (in relation to local gods).59  On the other hand, eastern Fijians were more ideal 
for conversion because they adhered to a hierarchical social structure, as opposed to the 
more egalitarian western Fijians.60  Adding to the preference for easterners was the fact 
that eastern Fijian society stressed that those of rank, especially the chiefs, were the 
direct descendants of various gods.61   
 After this classification, missionaries then endeavoured to abolish any 
unthinkable acts going on.62  The aim was to instil the belief in one omnipresent and 
omni-powerful deity as to curb some of the deplorable acts the missionaries felt were 
going on.63  Another aim was to make Fijians good Christians, because only then could 
they be trained to participate and progress in a civilized, capitalist society.64  Michael C. 
Howard et al have further interpreted the aims of missionaries as being three-fold: 1- to 
instil a desire in Fijians for European-produced consumer goods; 2- to encourage Fijians 
to plant cash crops so they could afford to live in the manner promoted by the 
missionaries; and 3- to promote the interests of the local indigenous ruling class.65  The 
basic theme here is that missionaries were forceful in trying to instil a sense of European 
values amongst the Fijians.  For example, Thomas Williams preached against what he 
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believed was the degradation of women (termed the slavery of women) because of their 
participation in outdoor labour.66  Williams also preached against polygamy in Fiji, 
which was seen as “unnatural, unreasonable, and evil.”67   
 The views and aims of Christian missionaries were reflected in the codification 
of “traditional” customary laws.  Martha Kaplan observed that any unacceptable 
practices deemed heathen and superstitious were challenged, and in some cases 
suppressed, by Christian missionaries.68  The consequence of this was that those 
traditional practices deemed unsuitable by missionaries and the colonial authorities were 
made criminal offences.69   
Establishment of the Fijian Elite 
 British colonial preferences for a strong traditional leadership to maintain order 
and stability fit together neatly with the hierarchical nature of eastern Fijian society.70  
As John D. Kelly alludes to, the British favoured eastern systems because it would be 
more effective to maintain law and order, which was necessary in order to protect 
various interests, including those of European planters.71  And with the eastern chiefs 
giving the British their un-fettered loyalty, eastern systems were further accepted.72  
Hence, the colonial authorities gave the eastern chiefs the responsibility of maintaining 
order in Fijian areas through Indirect Rule.  And the consequence of this policy was that 
it allowed the eastern chiefs to extend their status, power and privilege over the territory.  
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The power and status of the eastern chiefs was entrenched with the creation of 
institutions such as the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) and the Native Regulations 
Board (NRB).73   
The GCC was one of the first institutions created by the colonial authorities that 
legitimated eastern chiefly power, and whose creation would have many consequences.  
One outcome was that it gave the chiefs the power over things such as the administration 
of customary law and influence in the Colonial Legislative Council.74  Additionally, 
Fijians were placed in a more subservient position vis-à-vis the eastern chiefs as such 
institutions legitimated the chiefs’ power.  These institutions and power arrangements 
were justified by the eastern chiefs and the colonial authorities as being necessary in 
order to protect the Fijian culture.  O.H.K. Spate stated in his 1959 report that “[there] 
was a firm belief [amongst the chiefs] in hereditary authority and corresponding distrust 
in the capacity of ordinary men to run their own affairs.” 75  For example, when there 
were proposals to introduce elections for Fijian Members of the Legislative Council 
(MLCs), the chiefs resisted such efforts by claiming that they spoke for all Fijians 
because only they knew what was best for the Fijian community.76  While the chiefs 
enjoyed the privileges of power, the Fijian grassroots were confined to the traditional 
way of life which was based on subsistence agriculture.   
 The colonial period created a land tenure system to help protect the traditional 
way of life for the Fijian people.  This system, which divided Fijian land according to 
the mataqali (clan) system, was meant to standardize land tenure and prevent the 
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alienability of land to foreigners.77  The chiefs especially argued that keeping land in 
Fijian hands was the only way of protecting the traditional village life of Fijians.  
Additionally, it would also insulate the Fijian grassroots from the capitalist system until 
they were ready to compete in it.  This meant that the Fijian people were encouraged 
(and for the most part forced) to work in rural villages because the village was identified 
as being essential to protect Fijian values and way of life.78  In the village, there was no 
real specialization of labour.  Labour was mobilized when those with authority, such as 
the senior members of the household, local kin-group and those of special rank decided 
that such labour was necessary.79  Furthermore, employment of labour in the Fijian 
community was greatly dependent on obligations.  The key element of Fijian society 
was that loyalty came above all else, whether it be loyalty to the group, or identifying 
with (and giving allegiance to) chiefs and elders as sources of authority.80  One 
complaint brought up in the Spate report was that the system of land tenure was based 
only on Bauan (eastern) tradition.81  Spate complained about other elements of the 
system as well.  One problem he saw was that a status quo system had been 
implemented, and nothing was being done to encourage Fijians to modernize, including 
entering the capitalist economy.82  Additionally, Spate felt that land was not being 
divided up properly, as there was no connection between the number of cultivators, the 
amount of land available, and the amount of land being distributed to the mataqali.83  
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The problem he identified (and one that continues to be highlighted today) was that 
some mataqali with few members received large allotments of land, while some 
mataqali with many members did not receive enough land.84   
 Fijian leaders also played a large role in helping to create and maintain 
segregation between ethnic groups, argued as being necessary in order to maintain the 
paramountcy of the Fijian people.  Ratu Epeli Ganilau highlighted this sentiment in 1922 
when he said “…We strongly object to being ruled by Indians, as we always have 
regarded British rule to be the sole foundation of honour, justice and fairness.”85  This 
sentiment described the rationale in establishing two sources of authority for Fijians.  In 
addition to the colonial government (which was greatly influenced by the eastern chiefs), 
parallel Fijian institutions were also implemented to maintain law and order in the Fijian 
community.  These institutions were, and continue to be, used by the Fijian elite to help 
protect traditional Fijian society, as well as to enforce ethnic segregation.  Some of these 
institutions (some of which were highlighted earlier) included the Great Council of 
Chiefs (the GCC), the Native Regulations Board (the NRB), the Fijian Administration 
(the successor to NRB), and the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB, which will be 
discussed in a later chapter).  The Spate Report raised a concern that these institutions 
affected the level of cooperation between the groups because no concessions were made 
to the Indo-Fijians unless it coincided with the self-interest of the Fijian elite.86  The 
Burns Commission, which followed the Spate Commission, expanded on Spate’s 
concerns, stating that these institutions were creating divisions that were retarding 
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progress and growth in Fiji.87  Moreover, the eastern chiefs further solidified their power 
when they were given positions within the colonial government and administration.88  
Therefore, any threats to their power had to be averted.  For example, the Fijian elite 
rejected the suggestion made by Indo-Fijians that a common roll be implemented in 
voting for Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs).  The Fijian elite claimed (and 
were supported by the European members) that democracy was unsafe and unwise 
because it would lead to the domination of one group over another.89  The Fijian elite 
felt deeply threatened by the Indo-Fijians, especially when the latter’s population began 
to challenge that of the Fijian people, and when Indo-Fijians began rising in economic 
clout.90     
Indo-Fijians and Protests 
 Arrangements were made in 1878 to bring indentured labourers from India, and 
they began arriving in Fiji in 1879.91  The colonial authorities (in conjunction with the 
eastern chiefs) decided that Fijians should not be allowed to work on the sugar 
plantations because it would destabilize Fijian society.  Initially, Indo-Fijians were not 
viewed as a threat because the belief was they would either leave for India after their 
contracts ended, or if they stayed, they would not amount to more than agricultural 
labourers.92  While some Indo-Fijians returned to India, most stayed after the end of 
their indenture contracts.  Those Indo-Fijians that remained in Fiji became involved in a 
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variety of occupations, including: cane farming, operating small shops, and engaging in 
entrepreneurial initiatives.  The arrival of wealthy Gujaratis from India dramatically 
increased the threat felt by the European and Fijian communities, in terms of both 
economic and political power.93  The Indo-Fijians became an even greater threat when 
the size of their population grew to challenge that of the Fijian people.  In response, the 
colonial authorities and Fijian chiefs tried to minimize the role of the Indo-Fijians in the 
colony. This led Indo-Fijian leaders to protest their lack of equal status with their 
counterparts. 
 One area that the Indo-Fijian leaders protested was the lack of equality in the 
political arena, including the Legislative Council.  The Arya Samaj was one group that 
campaigned for Indo-Fijian political equality in the colonial period.  The Samaji, as they 
were known, included the more educated members of the Indo-Fijian community, and 
were amongst those who sought equality in Fiji.94  It cannot be denied that there were 
also rivalries within the Indo-Fijian community, including between orthodox and 
reformist Hindus; Muslims and Hindus; India-born and Fiji-born Indo-Fijians.95   For 
example, the Samaji, who were a reformist Hindu sect, were in dispute with other Indo-
Fijian groups, including with conservative Hindus, and with Muslims because they did 
not like the open sale of beef.96  However, one common grievance that all Indo-Fijian 
groups agreed on was that they did not feel the colonial government was treating them 
equally in comparison with other British subjects.  
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They called for elections to the Legislative Council by a common roll arguing 
that political rights should not be based on status.97  Moreover, they demanded the 
installation of democratic mechanisms to replace the nomination system that existed.  
However, Indo-Fijian leaders believed that it was acceptable to impose certain 
restrictions on the franchise, such as language qualifications.98  While it is true that the 
Legislative Council came to be partially elected after 1929, most MLCs continued to be 
appointed during the majority of the colonial period, as all motions made by Indo-Fijian 
MLCs for a common roll were defeated.99  A communal roll was implemented, in 
conjunction with the continuation of appointments for Fijians until the 1960s, with the 
argument being that this was needed to protect certain interests, especially those of the 
Fijians. Additionally, the British and the chiefly elite intensified efforts to keep the 
ethnic groups separate, including maintaining the ban on Indo-Fijians from living in 
Fijian villages.  They feared that if the groups came together, and started to find 
common grievances, it would lead to trouble in controlling the Fijians, as they would 
begin to question the authority structure in place.100  Actions taken by Indo-Fijian 
soldiers, who withdrew their services from the British war effort during World War II to 
protest the fact that they were paid less than their British counterparts, did not help 
things either.101  Such protests led the colonial authorities and the eastern chiefs to vilify 
the Indo-Fijians as selfish, and portrayed them as a threat that could not be ignored.   
 A second area where Indo-Fijians protested their lack of equality was in the 
economic sphere, most notably in agriculture.  One key area was the distribution of land.  
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As discussed earlier, Fijians were given ownership of approximately 83% of the land in 
order to preserve Fijian paramountcy.  The Indo-Fijians protested because this did not 
conform to the plurality that had come to exist.102  Furthermore, there was a concern that 
individual earning capacities were being negatively affected by the system of land 
tenure.103  During the colonial period, Indo-Fijians had to lease land either from the 
CSR, or from the Fijians.  The problem with leasing from the Fijians was that there were 
an increasing number of farmers whose leases were not being renewed because the 
Fijians wanted to benefit from the profits of sugarcane farming.104  This is a 
phenomenon that continues today, which will be further discussed in chapter two.   
 Two growers’ associations formed during the colonial period illustrate the 
historical background behind Indo-Fijian grievances towards land tenure and the 
reaction of the Fijian elite to these concerns.  One association formed was the Kisan 
Sangh (created in 1937), which was a moderate organization, whose membership 
included the more prosperous cane growers.105  The Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh 
(better known as the Maha Sangh) was created in June 1941, and was considered to be 
more militant.  The differences between these organizations were first illustrated in the 
cane strike of 1943.  This strike protested the fact that the prices paid by the CSR to cane 
farmers did not keep up with the rising cost of living.106  The Maha Sangh called for 
cane farmers not to harvest their crop if prices were not increased; the Kisan Sangh 
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waited for a commission to hear the Indo-Fijians.  This eventually led to the latter 
organization splitting into two, as the more militant members wanted to boycott the 
harvest.107  Despite the difference in positions, this strike showed that the Indo-Fijians 
were no longer satisfied with the lack of equality.  This was evident in a quote by a CSR 
historian, who stated that “... the Company was perhaps, slow in changing its dominating 
attitude towards the Indians as they developed from indentured labourers to relatively 
prosperous farmers and mill workers. …”108  The differences seen in 1943 strike were 
also evident in the 1960 cane strike.  When the cane contract ended in 1960, there were 
calls for an increase in prices paid to cane farmers.  And when an impasse ensued, some 
resolved not to harvest the cane, with the Maha Sangh leading the charge.109  The key in 
this was that the more moderate leaders condemned the strike, claiming that such 
measures were harming relations with other groups.110  It cannot be denied that these 
unions exhibited signs of intra-group rivalry within the Indo-Fijians, especially between 
the leaders.  The more militant Indo-Fijians wanted things to change quickly, while the 
more moderate organizations wanted to work within the system as far as possible.  
However, the common grievance articulated was that Indo-Fijians involved in 
agriculture lacked a sense of security with regards to land tenure including getting and/or 
maintaining leases. It is also important to note that these strikes gave the Fijian elite an 
opportunity to justify their rule.  Grievances over land tenure were, and continue to be, 
used by the Fijian elite to vilify Indo-Fijians as a threat to the Fijian culture.  They 
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further argued that the Fijian culture would suffer the plight of the Aborigines and Maori 
without the elite being in charge.111   
Conclusion 
 The actions and events of the colonial period have left a lasting imprint on the 
Fijian landscape.  The British introduced the concept of Divide and Rule as a way of 
controlling the inhabitants of Fiji while maintaining their power base.  One of the 
biggest aspects of British rule was the introduction of Indo-Fijians through the indenture 
system, while at the same time maintaining the paramount position of the Fijians.  The 
Christian missionaries made an impact by promoting eastern systems, as they were 
considered superior compared to their western counterparts.  The consequence here is 
that it helped lead to the adoption of eastern governing structures during the colonial 
period.  The position of the eastern Fijian elite was entrenched. They legitimated their 
authority by pointing to the Deed of Cession establishing the principle of Fijian 
paramountcy.  The impact of this was that it helped the chiefs design a system that 
anchored their power and prestige in the colony.  The Indo-Fijians were able to rise up 
from their initial position as indentured labourers. The subsequent increase in their 
population and growing economic power made them a threat.  The Indo-Fijians 
recognized that they were being held back by the institutional structures of the colonial 
administration calling for equality between the groups.  The impact of interaction 
between these groups is that it laid the foundation for the events that have taken place 
today. 
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Chapter Two- Fijian Elite Interaction with the Fijian People 
Introduction 
 
 Interaction by the Fijian elites with the Fijian grassroots and the framework that 
they have built up to serve Fijians has tried to reinforce ethnic differences in the country.  
But what type of framework has been developed by the Fijian elites to deal with ethnic 
accommodation in the post-independence period?  And how has this framework been 
used by the Fijian elites to maintain their status and privilege? 
 At first glance, attention could be directed to the various constitutions that have 
been instituted in the post-independence era.  Fiji has had three constitutions since 
independence: the first one was passed in 1970 after achieving independence from Great 
Britain; a second constitution that was passed in 1990 by Rabuka’s civilian government 
after the second coup of 1987; and the third and current constitution was passed in 1997, 
although it was briefly abrogated after the coup of 2000.   
 Some of the inherited colonial institutions were incorporated into all three 
constitutions, and continue to affect the workings of the country.  The Native Lands 
Trust Board (NLTB) continues to have a great impact on land policy.  The Agricultural 
Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA) and the Native Land and Trust Act (NLTA) are 
examples of legislation that also derive their history from the colonial era.  Other 
institutions such as the GCC have also helped to maintain a de facto Divide-and-Rule 
policy by creating separation between the various groups in Fiji. The Fijian elite claims 
that these institutions are required to safeguard and maintain the traditions and customs 
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of the Fijian people.112  Additionally, the chiefs have argued that they must play the 
leading role in the affairs of the country because only they can protect the interests of the 
Fijian people.113  The resulting consequence is Fijian leaders interact in such a way with 
Fijians to create an image of “us-vs-them” with regards to the Indo-Fijians.  More 
specifically, the fears being spread are that, if the Fijian elite is weak, the Fijian people 
will be left in a classless state like that of the Maori in New Zealand and the Aborigines 
in Australia.114  This type of rhetoric has had several consequences.  One is that land 
continues to be a source of great tension.  Additionally, the Fijian elite have made 
numerous appeals that Indo-Fijians pose a great threat to the principle of Fijian 
paramountcy, in part because they want access to more Fijian land.   
Protection of Fijian Interests and Paramountcy 
 The Fijian Affairs Board articulated in the Wakaya letter, written to the British in 
1963, that the chiefs required the necessary power to ensure the survival of the Fijian 
people and their culture.115  The independence period has not led to any de-emphasis by 
the Fijian elite of the importance of this principle.  The Fijian elite continue to point out 
that this principle was entrenched in the Deed of Cession of 1874, arguing that Fijian 
high chiefs ceded Fiji to Great Britain to protect the Fijian culture.116  The effect of this 
is that the Fijian elite, including the eastern chiefs, has been able to maintain their power 
by controlling the key institutions of the State.   
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 The Alliance Party,117 a party dominated by the eastern chiefs, used the political 
arena to enforce this principle when they governed from 1970-1987.  By creating the 
Alliance Party, Fijian leaders wished to follow the example of the Malay bumiputras in 
Malaysia, a political leadership comprised of social superiors in that country.118  The 
bumiputra-led Government that came to power in Malaysia in the late 1960s instituted 
policies such as the New Economic Policy (NEP), arguing that it had to help indigenous 
Malaysians establish their paramountcy in Malaysia.119  The rhetoric of paramountcy 
that was used in Malaysia in the late 1960s is similar to that used by the Fijian elite to 
the present day.  In essence, the Alliance Party was another institutional tool to maintain 
control over the Fijian people. Stephanie Lawson has argued that the Alliance Party (and 
after its demise, its off-shoots) was used by the eastern chiefs to create a sense of 
cultural homogeneity among Fijians.120  More specifically, unity was forged by joining 
all Fijians under the leadership of the Fijian elite, which was argued “… as necessary for 
maintaining the ‘natural’ order of the world…”121   
 During its tenure, leaders of the Alliance Party respected democratic principles, 
such as the rule of law, only if it served their self-interest.122  For example, colonial 
systems and institutions such as the GCC and the NLTB were incorporated into all three 
constitutions, thus allowing the Fijian elite to maintain control over the Fijian people in 
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the name of protecting the paramountcy of the Fijian culture.123  The constitutional 
entrenchment of the principle of Fijian paramountcy would mean that other groups could 
be discriminated against in order to maintain this principle.  Ralph Premdas has argued 
that the claims of the Fijian elite are wrapped up in cultural symbols to legitimize their 
positions of power.124   
 This explanation rationalizes the set-up of the 1970 constitution.  For example, 
the constitution incorporated a Bill of Rights, as well as incorporating multi-ethnic 
representation in Parliament.125  However, the constitution also included a stipulation 
that a two-thirds majority in each house was required in order to pass any amendments 
to this document.126  This may seem standard when compared to the process required to 
make constitutional amendments in western countries, but the Senate included eight 
GCC appointed Senators, meaning that their votes were crucial in passing any 
constitutional amendments.127  And while the 1970 Constitution did not constitutionally 
recognize the GCC, it did give them the power to make Senate appointments.  The GCC 
is given such powers because they are seen as reflecting the chiefs’ moral, spiritual and 
political authority amongst the Fijian people, making them the legitimate voice of the 
Fijian grassroots.128  Moreover, such institutions allowed the Fijian elite to protect and 
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advance their own interests.   For example, moves made by Alliance governments, such 
as the nationalization of the sugar industry in 1973, were done to benefit those who were 
members of, or had connections with, the Fijian elite.129  However, the Fijian elite 
justified such actions as being necessary to protect the paramountcy of the Fijian people.  
Extremists within the Alliance Party allowed the Fijian elite to further use the principle 
of Fijian paramountcy to solidify their power in the country.  These members argued that 
stability in Fiji can be maintained only if Fijians maintained their paramountcy.130  
Therefore, when questions of the power of the Fijian elite were brought up, the Alliance 
Party, as well as later pro-Fijian governments, posited that they were the only ones who 
could protect Fijian paramountcy. 
 The Fiji Labour Party (the FLP), created out of the Trade Union Movement, 
posed a strong challenge to the power of the Fijian elite because it questioned who really 
benefited from Fijian paramountcy.131  At the launching of the FLP, the party’s first 
leader, Dr. Timoci Bavadra explicitly stated that “…what has become increasingly 
apparent is that a tremendous gap exists between the ruling party’s rhetorical claims to 
serving the interests of the people, and its policies.”132  In another speech, Bavadra 
suggested, “… [surviving the] Alliance’s unholy rule for sixteen long years is an 
achievement itself.  But the peace of the people has limits, just as the powers of the 
rulers must have limits.”133  Therefore, the creation of the FLP worried the Alliance 
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Party, especially the chiefs, because the FLP platform shifted focus away from race, and 
concentrated more on socio-economic issues, including the corruption of the Alliance 
government.  The FLP-led Coalition victory in the 1987 elections troubled the Fijian 
elite.  Their biggest fear was that the victory would lead to the inception of properly 
western democratic ideals, which would lead to the questioning of, amongst other things, 
chiefly power and privileges.  The FLP was further vilified because its caucus was 
dominated by Indo-Fijians.134  These two factors led the chiefly-led Alliance members to 
stress that since Fijians were not in power, the Fijian culture would be trumped by FLP’s 
wish to introduce multiculturalism in Fiji.135  These fears led to the creation of the 
Taukei Movement (led by many eastern chiefs), which orchestrated a campaign of 
destabilization aimed at bringing down the government in the name of maintaining 
Fijian paramountcy.136  This movement culminated in the subsequent coups of 1987.  Lt. 
Col. Sitiveni Rabuka, the leader of the 1987 coups, believed that  
“…in that Deed, the chiefs of Fiji, who represented the Fijian people, ceded Fiji to Great 
Britain….when the power, the sovereign authority was returned [at independence], it 
came back to everybody who was living in Fiji…the Fijians felt that [it] should have 
been handed back to their chiefs…and not to strangers.”137   
 
 He added that “…I believe that the justice in this case is justice for the Fijians to 
determine their own destiny in their own land.”138 Rabuka justified his actions as 
necessary in order to remove the threats posed by the FLP-Coalition, as well as to 
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remove a constitution that was negatively affecting the Fijian people.139  The subsequent 
1990 Constitution included entrenching the paramountcy of the Fijian people, but 
mainly through increased representation in the political arena.  Fijians were given thirty-
seven out of seventy seats in the House of Representatives, while twenty-four out of 
thirty-four seats in the Senate of Chiefs were reserved for Fijians.140  Additionally, 
positions such as the Presidency and the Prime Minister-ship were also reserved for 
Fijians.141  This constitution also entrenched the role of the GCC in the country, 
including giving it the power to select the President.142  The allocation of such powers 
was designed to ensure that Fijians, and with it the Fijian elite, would remain in power.   
 The above discussion poses a question: who really gained power from the 1987 
coups?   This is asked because the coups led to the suspension of democracy, and mainly 
members of the Alliance governments prior to the 1987 coups led the “civilian 
administration” that governed from 1987-1992.143  Additionally, Rabuka gained power 
within the civilian administration, and secured immunity for his actions in the coup.144  
Brian Martin has drawn attention to the fact that Prime Minister Mara and Governor-
General Ganilau (both high chiefs from the east) played rather ambiguous and 
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suspicious roles during and after the 1987 coups.  For example, both were restored to 
their former positions in the civilian administrations after the coups.145   
 However, some have argued that Rabuka, who became Prime Minister after 
Mara became the President, was not totally insensitive to non-Fijians in the Parliament.  
After all, he twice solicited the support of Indo-Fijian parties to gain and maintain 
power: he required the help of the FLP to gain power in 1992, and he required the help 
of the National Federation Party (NFP) to keep power in 1994.146  One can also concede 
that Rabuka played a leading role in the setting up the 1996 Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC, which led to the Reeves Report, the document that outlined the 
findings of the 1996 CRC), and ultimately, the1997 Constitutional Amendment.147  
However, section 161 of the 1990 Constitution forced Rabuka to set-up the CRC, as the 
section stated that the constitution had to be reviewed within seven years of first being 
implemented.148  Moreover, contrary to popular belief, the Fijian elite were not as 
accommodating in the passage of the 1997 constitution. In reality, it was the NFP leader, 
Jai Ram Reddy, who offered to compromise when the Fijian factions wanted to throw 
out the Reeves report because they felt that it did not give Fijians enough power.149   
 This leads to a further question: who do the Fijian elite really represent?  The 
Reeves report clearly highlighted this concern when it stated that  
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“…Throughout this century the colonial government enunciated the principle that the 
interests of Fijians must always remain paramount.  In part, the assertion of this 
principle reflected genuine concern…in part it served the interests of the 
colonisers….the principle [came to be] widely accepted and became part of the political 
culture (emphasis added).”150   
 
The report later stated that  
“…the constitution should be based on the principle that the interests of all communities 
must be recognised and protected.  It should explicitly recognise the protective function 
of the principle that the interests of the indigenous Fijians are paramount, on the 
understanding that it does not involve the relegation of the interests of other 
communities.”151 
The preamble of the 1997 Constitution specifically makes reference to the unique 
situation of the Fijian people, including the principle of paramountcy outlined in the 
Deed of Cession.152  Furthermore, section 6(d) makes reference to Fijian paramountcy in 
that “the rights of the Fijian and Rotuman people include their right to governance 
through their separate administrative systems.”153 Section 116(1) also affirms and 
recognizes the Great Council Chiefs, further securing Fijian paramountcy.154  
Additionally, in contradiction to the Reeves report, which recommended more national 
seats in relation to communal seats, more seats were reserved on the basis of ethnicity, 
as shown in Appendix I. 
         Those involved in the 2000 coup also justified their actions as being necessary 
because Fijian paramountcy had not been maintained. `Paramountcy’ was threatened by 
the multi-cultural orientation of the FLP Government elected in 1999.  There will be 
more discussion on Chaudhry’s FLP Government later in the section on the Indo-Fijian 
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threat.  However, it has been argued that the 2000 coup was a way for the Fijian elite to 
acquire more power for themselves.  The following discussion will highlight some of the 
key players in the coup, all of whom had ambitions of gaining more power and wealth. 
For example, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, the man who took over from Rabuka as head of the 
SVT Party after they lost power in the 1999 election, was allegedly planning a coup to 
oust Prime Minister Chaudhry with disenchanted members of rival parties.155  These 
parties are said to include PANU (a group of western chiefs), and the VLV (a group who 
wanted Fiji to be declared a Christian state), who felt Rabuka had abandoned the goals 
of the 1987 Coups).156  The 2000 coup was carried out by the Counter Revolutionary 
Warfare Unit (CRWU), a team that included retired Captain Ligairi. It is argued that the 
CRWUs involvement was supported by Fijian military and political leaders, as well as 
other Fijians with ties to the Fijian elite interested in gaining more power.157  The 
infamous George Speight, a key figure in the 2000 coup and its aftermath, is also 
included in many discussions.  He is well known for justifying the coup as being 
necessary because “…it is [about protecting] the supreme rights of our indigenous 
people in Fiji.”158  Speight also dismissed the 1997 Constitution after the coup, and tried 
to dismiss President Mara (who was eventually forced out by the military civilian 
administration several days after the coup) and the authority of the GCC.  However, 
Speight’s motives are questioned because he benefited from contracts given out by the 
                                                 
155 Robbie Robertson and William Sutherland, Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of Fiji’s 
2000 Coup, (Australia: Photo Press, 2003), 6. 
156 Ibid. 6-7. 
157 Sam Howe Verhovek, “Burst of Ethnic Tension in Fiji Threatens South Seas Eden,” in The New York 
Times, 7 June 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/960100fiji-crisis.html  (11 November 
2004). 
158Andrew Robertson, “Island of Intolerance?  The Fijian Debacle,” in Harvard International Review, 
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles?id=991  (3 October 2004). 
 40
Rabuka government prior to the election of the Chaudhry government in 1999.159  
Additionally, while arguing that he was trying to maintain Fijian paramountcy, Speight 
is more known for trying to secure power for himself in the civilian administration.  For 
example, he bitterly opposed the appointment of Laisenia Qarase as interim Prime 
Minister in July 2000.160 Rabuka, who had become the GCC chair by the time of the 
2000 coup, cannot be left out of consideration either.  Rabuka’s role as an international 
statesman had consistently been growing, which was indicative in him mediating the 
ethnic clashes in the Solomon Islands.161  It is alleged that Rabuka wanted a top position 
within the country, such as the Presidency.  It is argued that he offered to mediate the 
aftermath of the coup to show his worth as a political head of state.  In his brief stint as 
mediator, Rabuka unsuccessfully asked Mara to resign as President, which eventually 
led the latter to terminate Rabuka’s tenure as mediator.162  Another claim is that Rabuka 
wanted to become the military commander after the 2000 Coup.163  Additionally, 
Rabuka has showed that he still has political aspirations.  For example, Rabuka has been 
trying to form a “multiracial party” since 2004 to run in the next election.164  What this 
shows is that Rabuka will use any avenue possible to gain power, including using multi-
ethnic appeals to gain support.         
 Current Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase’s role in securing power cannot be 
understated either.  Shortly after Qarase was named Prime Minister of the interim 
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government after the 2000 Coup, he threatened Chaudhry’s deposed government to 
support his administration or face the consequences of the law.165  Additionally, after 
Qarase won the 2001 election, he would not include Chaudhry in the constitutionally 
mandated multiparty Cabinet.166  Furthermore, Qarase asked for the 1997 constitution to 
be amended in 2002 to re-establish the primacy of the Fijian people.167  In 2002, 
Qarase’s government rejected calls by opposition parties and NGOs to establish a proper 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission like that established in South Africa after the end 
of apartheid, claiming that such a commission would not be beneficial in healing 
tensions in Fiji.168  And the Unity Commission set up in 2002 basically excluded Indo-
Fijians further strengthening the argument that Qarase’s Government wanted to create 
unity within the entire Fijian community as to create legitimacy and support for their 
power.  While Qarase has recently introduced a Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity 
Bill, argued as being necessary to help reduce ethnic tensions in the aftermath of the 
2000 coup, this bill is flawed.  This bill, if passed in its current form, would make it 
easier for former Government Ministers and others associated with the 2000 coup to be 
granted amnesty.169   This is only a further illustration of how the Fijian elite, which 
includes the eastern Chiefs, have used their positions of power in order to serve their 
own interests.  The danger is that when threats are felt, the Fijian elite tends to resort to 
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any measure possible to keep their hold on power, using Fijian paramountcy as a major 
justification for their actions.           
 The purpose of this discussion is to show that Fijian leaders have done 
everything possible to try and secure power for themselves, justifying these moves as 
being necessary to protect the Fijian culture.  More importantly, it is the Fijian elite that 
use ethno-nationalistic rhetoric to gain control over the country, and use these resources 
for their own personal benefit.  And as will be discussed later on, the Fijian grassroots 
do not really benefit from these actions, and are not active participants in the promotion 
of ethno-nationalism.  The relevance of this is that caution must be used when analyzing 
ethnic relations in Fiji, because sentiments expressed by the Fijian elite do not mean that 
the Fijian grassroots also consistently hold these sentiments, or even feel that this is the 
main challenge to be overcome in the country. 
Fears of Indo-Fijian Domination       
 The Fijian elite have also raised fears of Indo-Fijian domination to justify the 
various positions and actions taken in the post-independence era.  These fears will be 
discussed in this section. 
Indo-Fijian Political Power and Aspirations      
 The cordial cooperation between Prime Minister Mara and Opposition leader 
Koya in the brief period after independence was short-lived, and the negative aftermath 
continues to be felt today.  One of the key areas of conflict has been over the issue of the 
common roll, which has its roots from the colonial era.  But it is important to re-visit the 
topic, because the issue continues to affect how the Fijian elite have portrayed the Indo-
Fijians, which is seen to have increased the level of ethnic tensions in the country.  Indo-
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Fijian leaders have argued that the communal roll system negatively affects integration 
and advancement, although many have come to approve of the principle of Fijian 
paramountcy.170  The 1975 Royal Commission on Fiji’s Electoral System mentioned that 
“…if Fiji is to take its place in the international world of today it cannot afford to 
maintain an electoral system which can be represented as racialism.”171  However, the 
chiefly-dominated Alliance Party resisted this demand (despite their assertion that the 
common roll was a “long-term objective”) claiming that “…the undermining of the 
constitutional protection afford[ed] to Fijian interests- is too much for any Fijian leader 
to entertain.”172  The 1987 coup occurred in part because the compromises made in 1970 
were greatly eroded by the mid 1980’s.173  Norman Feller adds that the 1987 coups were 
orchestrated partly because the Fijian elite could not see the Indian majority taking 
power.174  The other justification for the 1987 coups was to retain Fijian paramountcy.  
Moments before the May 1987 Coup, MP Taniela Veitata stated that “…a life of peace 
and harmony has been the governing principle upon which the Fijian people have been 
living their lives ever since the arrival of Christianity…”175  Rabuka partially 
rationalized the May 1987 coup by claiming that the Indo-Fijians (referring to them as 
the “immigrant race” and “heathens”) threatened the culture, heritage, and Christian 
principles of the Fijian people.176   Sanjay Ramesh argues that because the Bavadra 
government posed a threat to the chiefs with their non-racial political platform, the 
                                                 
170 Victor Lal, Fiji Coups in Paradise, 39. 
171 Ibid. 35. 
172 Ibid. 47. 
173 Ralph R. Premdas, Ethnic Conflict and Development, 55. 
174Norman Meller.  “Ethnic and Racial Cleavages in Pacific Island Constitutions.”  The Journal of Pacific 
History, (September 1997) http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2375/is_n2_v32/ai_20554490  (15 
September 2004). 
175 Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova, Rabuka: No Other Way, 9. 
176 Ibid. 126. 
 44
Alliance Party, led by Ratu Mara (who was a high chief from the east), argued that the 
FLP was trying to break the racial balance that the Alliance had constructed and 
maintained since independence.177  The FLP was also portrayed as being an Indo-Fijian-
dominated organization trying to take power away from Fijians, thus raising fears that 
Fijians would become subject to outsiders.178  Therefore, the Alliance Party was seen as 
mobilizing the Taukei Movement prior to the May 1987 coup to gain support for the 
feudal-style hierarchy that helped them gain and retain their privilege.179                                                 
 With the 2000 coup, many of the same arguments seen in 1987 were used to 
mobilize support against the Chaudhry-led FLP-Coalition government. The Fijian elite 
played a key role in the organization of the 2000 coup, because as seen with the Bavadra 
government, Chaudhry’s FLP government tried to govern based on socio-economic 
issues (much like Bavadra’s government).  It is true that Chaudhry made some mistakes 
that alienated some of his supporters.  For instance, he attacked some of the 
constitutional compromises that Reddy had made with Rabuka (such as communal seats 
being given pre-dominance) to get the 1997 Constitution passed.180  He also did not 
consult with the chiefs on some government initiatives, such as the awarding of certain 
contracts.181  The latter move threatened the Fijian elite, leading to the accusation that 
the Indo-Fijians were taking over the country. This led then President Ratu Mara to 
remove Chaudhry as Prime Minister in the aftermath of the 2000 coup, installing Tevita 
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Momoedonu as the acting Prime Minister.182  The GCC was also actively involved in the 
discussions of a new constitution to guarantee that Fijian interests would not be 
subservient to those of the Indo-Fijians.183  The consequence of this was that Indo-
Fijians became the targets of violence of “mobilized” Fijians with the installed military 
government quietly supporting such actions.184  Basically, the elite gave the coup life 
and tried to legitimize subsequent actions arguing that Fijians did not trust the Indo-
Fijian-led government. 
The threat of Indo-Fijian Economic Power       
 Although emphasized less when compared to the political power of the Indo-
Fijians, the Fijian elite has also targeted the perceived economic power of the Indo-
Fijians.  The two coups (and their aftermaths) showed that the Fijian elite did not want 
anyone to question the privileges and status that they had acquired (or were in process of 
acquiring).  Rabuka believed that “Fiji was for the Fijians,” and the Indo-Fijians had to 
be challenged because they had attained more than their fair share of business and the 
economy.185  Additionally, it was argued that Indo-Fijians occupied more professional 
positions and were preventing Fijians from progressing.186  Moreover, the Fijian elite 
argued that Indo-Fijians were “flaunting” their material prosperity because many own 
businesses, and worse, refuse to hire Fijian workers.187  These facts, according to the 
elite, supported the need for remedies that would benefit Fijians. Such grievances were 
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reflected in the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions with the introduction of constitutionally 
mandated affirmative action programs.  The 1990 Constitution is regarded to have 
instituted a form of pseudo-apartheid by means of Chapter III, Fijian and Rotuman 
Interests, which privilege these groups over all others.188  The 1997 Constitution, though 
regarded as a Compact, maintained special treatment for Fijians through initiatives such 
as affirmative action programs (constitutionally entrenched in section 6 (k), and Chapter 
V- Social Justice).189  These programs set aside jobs, projects, and scholarships for 
“disadvantaged groups” (i.e. Fijians) to help them overcome their poorer conditions.190  
Prime Minister Qarase stated earlier this year that affirmative action for Form Seven 
Fijian students is justified because it will help them to deal with the disadvantages they 
face.191  However, there are deep flaws in these affirmative action programs. Since 
affirmative action programs began, the Fijian elite, including the chiefs and bureaucrats, 
have taken advantage of its benefits, leaving little room for ordinary Fijians.192  For 
example, Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL), a creation of the GCC in 1984, has been used 
by members of the Fijian elite to expand their wealth.193  The NLTB and the Fijian 
Affairs Board (FAB) hold approximately 27% of the shares of FHL.194  Additionally, 
when the Fijian Affairs Board further invested in FHL in 1989 to expand the activities of 
the FHL, it did so with proceeds from a F$20 million loan by the Fijian government.  
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Moreover, the directors and shareholders of FHL included Qarase and other members of 
his current government, who benefited from increased activities of FHL, including 
higher dividends.195 Additionally, those that own the other 73% of shares are owned by 
bureaucrats and other members of the Fijian elite, as a $10,000 minimum has been 
required to invest in FHL since it became a private-holding company in 1992.196  
Therefore, Brij Lal has argued that such programmes are not accountable, transparent 
and fair for they have given the Fijian elite even more privileges over the Fijian 
grassroots.197  In other words, the Fijian elite have consistently used the rhetoric that 
affirmative action is necessary to tackle the Indo-Fijians economic threat to legitimately 
gain access to state resources to advance their own positions. 
Land 
 The issue of land in Fiji has been, and continues to be, a major source of tension 
between Fijians and Indo-Fijians.  The traditional communal land tenure system that has 
been in place since colonialism prohibits the private and individual alienation of Fijian 
land.198  Today, approximately 88% of the land is owned by the Fijians, leaving the 
Indo-Fijians and other groups to rely on leases of non-reserved Fijian land.199   
 Three types of land tenure exist in Fiji today.  First there is Native land, where 
the mataqali [indigenous clan] is the basic proprietary unit, and the Native Lands Trust 
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Board (the NLTB) administers the usage (including leases through legislation like 
Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (the ALTA) of the land.200  Both the NLTB and 
ALTA will be discussed shortly.  There is also Crown (State) Land, governed by the 
Crowns Land Act, of which there are three types: Schedule A land, where former Fijian 
land reverts to the Crown in the cases where a mataqali has become extinct; Schedule B 
land, where land was either not occupied, nor was it claimed by Fijians when the Native 
Lands Commission (NLC) was established in 1880; and State Freehold (which 
comprises one-third of state land), where land was bought from those issued Crown 
grants after the NLC was established, as well as land bought from Fijians between 1905 
and 1908.201  Lastly, there is Freehold Land, which only constitutes approximately 8% 
of land in Fiji, which can be bought or sold by private individuals.202 Ralph Premdas 
states that land is a powerful (if not the most powerful) bargaining tool that the Fijian 
elite possess, which could explain why the various governments (dominated by the 
Fijian elite) have maintained a rigid attitude towards land.203  The Fijian elite have 
consistently argued that since the time of Cession, there has been an understanding that 
Fijian land is unalienable, and it is their responsibility to do everything possible to 
protect Fijian land.204  However, this poses problems for Indo-Fijian farmers, who 
currently rent approximately 62% of the land leased out by the Fijians.205  These farmers 
want more land and longer leases so they can have more security. They fear that their 
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livelihood will disappear once their leases expire.206  This has led the Fijian elite to 
contend that the Indo-Fijians want to deprive the Fijians of their land.207  For example, 
the Taukei Movements (taukei means `our land’) prior to both the May 1987 and May 
2000 coups argued that the Indo-Fijians were infringing on the land rights of the 
Fijians.208  This argument shows how the elite continue to manipulate the facts, because 
every constitution has protected the land rights of the Fijians. This creates mistrust and 
increases the level of tension between Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) 
 The NLTB was created in 1940 by the Native Land Trust Ordinance (also known 
as the NLTO).  This was the result of Ratu Sukuna’s efforts to standardize and centralize 
the administration of the leasing of Fijian land.209  Thus, many of its powers and 
responsibilities include protecting Fijian land, and ensuring the survival of the natural 
and cultural heritage of the Fijian people.210  Prior to the passage of the NLTO, leases 
were negotiated independently, and the terms varied from lease to lease (though subject 
to some restrictions).211  By placing the administration of the leasing of Fijian land on a 
sound basis, it was argued that the NLTO (and the NLTB) would give Indo-Fijians more 
security of land tenure on the land that they leased.212              
 However, the creation of the NLTB did not, and still has not, eased the insecurity 
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of Indo-Fijians with regards to land tenure.  One problem is the lease arrangements 
under ALTA, which will be discussed shortly.  Another problem is that the NLTB has 
been used by the Fijian elite to serve their own interests.  A Ford Foundation article has 
argued that “…at the ideological level, entrenched vested interests use the notion of the 
vanua as a powerful instrument in securing conformity and forging solidarity.”213  In 
other words, the Fijian elite have used the NLTB to try and legitimize their power, 
arguing that if Fijian land is not protected, they will lose their way of life and fall prey to 
foreign influence.214  Isireli Lasaqa (1984:49) has stressed that Fijian land must be 
protected because the land is a source of identity for the Fijian people.  However, Robert 
Norton counters Lasaqa’s argument by stressing that the NLTB has been used to force 
unity within Fijian groups, which legitimizes the chiefs’ role as head of the Fijian 
people, and allows them to control and use the various institutions to serve their 
interests.215  The Spate Report stated, “…The… [basic] problem facing the Fijian today 
[includes amongst other things is] the work of the Native Land Trust 
Board…Unfortunately, discussion of these immediate problems is often side-tracked by 
an appeal to the Deed of Cession of 1874…”216 Having control over the NLTB has 
enabled the Fijian elite to increase the gap between themselves and Fijian commoners in 
terms of both power and wealth.  For example, revenues from land rented out by the 
NLTB are divided up as follows: 25% for the NLTB, 3.75% for the head of the vanua, 
7.5% for the head of the yavusa, 11.25% for the head of the mataqali, and 52.5% for 
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members of the mataqali.217  In 1998, this enabled the chiefs to pocket F$5.6 million of 
the F$18,726,453 (30%) in rent charged.218  At the beginning of 2005, the NLTB 
increased the annual lease administration fee to F$56.25 from F$22.50 to help pay for 
the costs of the NLTB, despite the fact the NLTB also receives grants from the 
government.219  In 1974, the Native Land Development Corporation (NLDC) was 
created as a subsidiary, thus allowing the NLTB, and with it the Fijian elite, to enter the 
development sector.220  For example in 1978, the NLTB leased sixteen acres of land to a 
development group for a project in Navesi without landowner approval, claiming that it 
did not need the consent of all the owners to carry on with such a project.221  The effect 
of this was that some of the land being cultivated by some mataqali was being leased out 
for development.222  The General Manager of the NLTB has even said that the NLTB 
wants to be the “one stop for investors,” meaning that the NLTB feels it has the 
authority to lease out land without landowner approval.223  The irony here is that the 
coups of 1987 and 2000 were undertaken to prevent the alienation of Fijians’ land 
without their approval.  A further irony is that the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions were 
argued as being necessary to protect Fijian land, although they did not give land any 
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more protection than the 1970 Constitution.224  These actions show that the NLTB is one 
institution being used as a tool by the elite to add to the feelings of mistrust between 
ethnic groups.  Additionally, the Fijian elite have also used the NLTB to further their 
own interests. 
Leasing Land: ALTA and Continuing Uncertainty                                                       
 The passage of the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Ordinance (ALTO) in 
1966 was designed to give tenants more security by establishing thirty year leases 
consisting of three ten-year terms.225  Furthermore, the landlord has to justify the 
hardships caused by leasing out the land in order to regain his land.226  However, there 
was still dissatisfaction amongst Indo-Fijians with ALTO because of the leasing period.  
This led to the passage of the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA, which is 
still in existence today) in 1976. The Act maintains the thirty-year lease period, but with 
an uninterrupted twenty-year period plus ten years (on approval).227  However, the 
thirty-year period is regarded as a de facto maximum, as the NLTB usually does not 
extend leases beyond this period.228  This fact causes much uneasiness amongst Indo-
Fijians.  Added to problems with the lease period, Indo-Fijians are also concerned 
because many leases are set to run out in the period between 1997 and 2005, and it has 
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been articulated that many will not be renewed.229  This is reflected by the fact that since 
1999, approximately 6000 cane leases have not been renewed.230    
 However, the NLTB has countered with their own contentions, arguing that they 
have the support of all Fijian landowners.  Some of the justifications for non-renewal 
include poor land use practices, and a desire by landowners to enter commercial 
farming.231  Additionally, the NLTB has argued that rent charged under ALTA, which is 
6% of unimproved capital value (UCV), is too low, as well as impossible to quantify.232  
These claims are made while the NLTB (and landowners) consistently demand that 
tenants pay periodic goodwill payments in cash and in kind, both during the lease and 
when considering renewal of leases.233  The NLTB has led the charge in complaining 
that the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA, which was used on all land transactions prior to 
the passage of ALTO and later ALTA) should be used in leasing out Fijian land because 
it allows for the market value to be charged.234  The NLTA currently applies to all 
agricultural land less than 2.5 acres, except for land in reserves.235  It also establishes 
lease tenure on a rolling five-to-ten year basis, with market value for land being charged, 
and with leases renewable with NLTB consent.236  The GCC, the NLTB, and the ruling 
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SDL Party led by Qarase support the case for NLTA replacing ALTA.237  This support 
was shown in 2002 when the Crown transferred control of some of its land to the Fijians.  
What it illustrated was that the Fijian elite are using land for their own benefit.  This 
land, previously administered under ALTA, now fell under the NLTA, meaning that the 
NLTB now has control over this land.238      
 Given the above discussion, it is ironic that, while the NLTB makes complaints 
about the practices of Indo-Fijian tenants, the Fiji Development Bank’s (FDB) Special 
Loans Division finances many unsuccessful rural initiatives.  While it true that the 
number of loans being approved has decreased, the value of these loans have also 
increased.239  However, the central level of the FDB has used its discretion to approve 
the loans of those applicants with connections to the Fijian elite.240  One could argue that 
these are two different institutions, which is true.  But, these points help to make the case 
that the Fijian elite have used land as one tool to further their own ambitions.  This all 
happens while the Indo-Fijians are portrayed as a threat to the ownership of Fijian land. 
 Conclusion                   
 The Fijian elite maintain the argument that they need to hold positions of power 
in order to protect the interests of Fijians.  This has meant that the principle of Divide 
and Rule is being forcefully applied in the post-independence era.  What this implies is 
that a label of inferiority is being applied to other ethnic groups in the country, namely 
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the Indo-Fijians.  The Fijian elite also maintain that the Indo-Fijians are an enemy that 
must be held in check, and it is only the Fijian elite that will be able to do this.  If they 
do not maintain power, there will be many irreversible consequences that will negatively 
affect the Fijian way of life.  Other groups are portrayed as targeting Fijian land, a key 
component of Fijian traditional life.  Furthermore, the paramount status of Fijians will be 
lost if other groups are able to gain dominance over the territory.  And last but certainly 
not least, Fijians will be subject to the dominance of the Indo-Fijians.  Therefore, it is 
argued that anything to prevent such a takeover must be utilized.  
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Chapter Three- The Grassroots Respond 
Introduction 
 The Fijian grassroots have been described as harbouring the same level of ethno-
nationalism as the Fijian elite because their leaders claim that all Fijians feel strongly 
about the threat posed by Indo-Fijians to the Fijian culture and people.  But is ethno-
nationalism really felt as strongly at the grassroots level as it is felt at the elite level?  Is 
ethno-nationalism the biggest priority of ordinary Fijians?  Or are there more pressing 
matters that they want addressed?  
 The assessment made is that while eastern Fijians do harbour some stereotypes 
and biases that are ethno-nationalistic in nature, they are not active participants in the 
promotion of ethno-nationalism.  However, there are other challenges that they face and 
want addressed.  In other words, the priorities of the grassroots differ from those of the 
Fijian elite.  Ordinary Fijians have indicated that other priorities need to be addressed in 
order for them to progress.  Poverty is seen as a key challenge that has to be alleviated.  
Women’s rights, including gender roles and stereotypes, also have been highlighted as 
requiring attention.  These issues will be discussed in this chapter to gain a sense of what 
is occurring at the grassroots level. 
 In assessing these issues, the role of NGOs will be discussed in order to see if 
they have had any effect in helping to alleviate the problems that the grassroots face.  In 
today’s globalizing world, NGOs are perceived to be important players in dealing with 
the grassroots because they have the freedom and flexibility to engage in more 
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activities.241  Therefore, this chapter will also discuss the role of NGOs within the 
context of some of the initiatives that need to be undertaken to improve the situation in 
Fiji. 
The Ideal Traditional Village Life  
 The first two chapters have discussed how the elite have stressed the importance 
of village life as being crucial to the survival of the Fijian people and their culture.  This 
implies that the location of Fijian commoners affects the level of identification with the 
values and attitudes of one’s culture.  Therefore, it is important to discuss the specifics 
of village life in eastern Fiji to gain an insight of how it influences their day-to-day lives, 
including their quality of life.   
 Life in Fijian villages is very conservative because the view is propagated that 
without strong adherence and enforcement of traditional beliefs, the Fijian culture will 
be irreparably damaged.  Therefore, the principles of communalism, hierarchy and 
paternalism are strictly enforced and followed. 
 Communalism places the expectation on Fijian villagers that they will work 
together for the benefit of the group.242  The belief is that proper social relations are the 
basis for the other spheres of life, including the psychological and economic aspects.  
This means that Fijian villagers must adhere to the principle of balance, where 
individual and group rights and obligations must both be attended to.243  Nayacakalou 
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(1975:15) highlighted that Fijians can live a proper communal life if they properly 
follow a social structure that is beyond the nuclear family.  These divisions are (in 
ascending order): i tokatoka, mataqali, and yavusa, with the mataqali (the clan) being 
given predominance.  These divisions dictate the level of economic cooperation, 
socialization, and intimate family life in the village.244  These divisions are also 
important for defining roles and responsibilities for things such as ceremonies, social 
occasions, and the employment of labour. This means that the various divisions make 
different contributions in the various village activities.245   For example, in village 
fundraising initiatives (known as soli), where money is raised for specific village 
projects, some divisions are expected to help in preparation of the feast accompanying 
the activity, while others may have more ceremonial roles.246  Additionally, all members 
are expected to make monetary contributions to the cause at hand which can impose 
hardship.247   
 Fijian villagers also continue to engage in kerekere (borrowing), where members 
of the unit ask each other for items with the expectations that no request will be turned 
down. 248  With kerekere, there is no requirement to pay back what was borrowed. 
Kerekere is seen by villagers as a source of pride because it shows the generosity of their 
culture.249  Fijian villagers also engage in other important rituals such as sevusevu (ritual 
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presentations) and kava (a traditional Fijian drink made of piper methysticum served 
during a variety of events) on a daily basis in the village.  Sevusevu is a basic offering 
which can be presented for a variety of reasons, for example, as a sign of appreciation by 
guests for the hospitality of their hosts.  Kava sessions are male-dominated events, 
where various issues and troubles are discussed.  These sessions (which are also referred 
to as yaqona or grog sessions) are lengthy events.  As Arno (1993: 81-84) has suggested 
these sessions can be used to catch up on gossip, or help to mediate conflicts or troubles 
facing particular villages, or to set the facts straight on certain cases.  Kava has become 
such a force that it is even present in diplomatic offices. 
 While cooperation is a big part of village life in general, adherence to the 
hierarchical and patriarchal elements of the social structure is also a major portion of life 
in the Fijian villages.  This leads to heavy emphasis on age, rank, and sex, thus creating 
fundamental inequities between people in the village.  Additionally, eastern villages 
place great emphasis on seniority. The distinction in authority between chiefs and the 
grassroots is the most obvious distinction.  Each chief at each level makes cumulative 
decisions for that particular division.  Chiefs of lower divisions make more but usually 
less important decisions for their particular group. The consequence of this is that chiefs 
of the higher divisions are given the responsibility of making key decisions because they 
are seen as being of a higher class.250  The implication of this is that the village chief, 
who is usually the most senior male member from the highest mataqali and/or yavusa 
within the village, has the authority to make important resolutions for the village as a 
whole, though the number of decisions he makes are few in number.251  The status of the 
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village chief is reflected in things such as seating arrangements at important events, 
respect given to him, and being given better living quarters within the village.252  Many 
Fijians continue to believe that respecting chiefs and elders is necessary for Fijians to 
retain their cohesiveness, as these members possess knowledge and experience that 
commoners do not.253  Eastern Fijians, who generally live in more isolated surroundings 
than their western counterparts, believe that their chiefs possess mana (a sense of 
godliness).  Therefore, many try and refrain from angering them fearing possible 
punishment for their transgressions.254   
 Communication within the village also illustrates the hierarchical and patriarchal 
system of Fijian culture.  For example, there are strict rules for communication between 
parents and children (known as veitamani), and between siblings (known as veitacini).255   
Communication in these relationships is asymmetrical, meaning that parents or older 
siblings are free to address their junior counterparts freely; junior members in the 
relationship are restricted in when and how they address their superiors.256  The same 
relationship extends to that the between chiefs and ordinary Fijians, especially in eastern 
villages.  This is why chiefs have had a great deal of success in imposing their views on 
the Fijian grassroots, because of the expectation that orders of superiors will not be 
questioned.257  Another type of relationship is that of restraint and avoidance, seen 
between the parent-in-law and the child-in-law (veivugoni).  This relationship sees 
mutual avoidance and restraint, where the pair avoids speaking if possible, but resorting 
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to the use of third parties when communication is necessary. 258  However, cross-cousin 
communication (veitavaleni) is generally more relaxed.  This means that the two in this 
association freely express their views to one another, and can even joke with one 
another.259   
 Men are given pre-eminence in the village because emphasis is placed on 
patrilineal descent.  This occurs because of the belief that men will carry the Fijian 
culture with them.260   Consequently, gender roles and relations are generally fixed.  
Although women play key roles within the household, they are also regarded as being 
powerless, burdened, and subject to men.261  Women are expected to serve men; men are 
to guide women; men are to speak on behalf of women at important functions.262  Any 
changes or challenges (perceived or actual) to this authority have serious consequences 
such as violence against women.     
 Religion, a pinnacle of Fijian life, is very important, especially to rural Fijians.  
As shown in Appendix II, most Fijians are Christians, with the majority belonging to the 
Methodist Church.  The church is seen as a unifying factor, because it brings Fijians 
together, and helps to sustain the principles of Fijian culture.263  The importance of 
religion is illustrated by the fact that the church (usually a Methodist Church) stands in 
the centre of the village.  Fijian Christianity has several principles.  One principle is that 
of loloma (kindly love), which teaches Fijians to submit to the principles of generosity 
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and reciprocity.264  Fijian commoners are taught that Jesus Christ’s Crucifixion 
illustrated the importance of espousing the principles of giving and sharing.265  
Therefore, loloma is seen as a key principle because it articulates the very essence of 
what it means to be Fijian.266  However, Fijian Christians are not individualistic, as they 
do not believe in things such as the natural state of sin, individual achievement of grace, 
and sense of universalism of belief.267  Nevertheless, Fijian Christians are taught to give 
to their church profusely because such offerings will be rewarded by god.268  
Additionally, the principles of unity and love are also taught to Fijian Christians, with 
sources such as the Ten Commandments being used to support such teachings.269  
Crucially, religion has also been used to re-enforce the traditional structures and 
attitudes.  For example, the traditional hierarchy of the village is re-enforced during 
church services, illustrated by seating arrangements of the congregation during the 
services.270  Furthermore, the churches suggest to Fijians that they are the chosen people 
of the land, and therefore everything must be done to prevent Fijians from experiencing 
what the Israelites endured during Biblical times.271  Father Kevin Barr articulates some 
of teachings previously used by some of these churches.  For example, Romans 13 was 
used to justify the chiefly system; ordinary Fijians were told that strict observance of the 
Sunday Sabbath placed them above idol worshippers; and Indo-Fijians were depicted as 
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heathens.272  Villagers are taught to espouse the principles of hierarchy, loyalty, and 
obedience.  Furthermore, Christianity has also been used to promote ethnic separation.   
The Importance of Money and the Onset of Poverty 
 It has been asserted by the Fijian elite that the village is crucial for the survival of 
the Fijian people, and therefore they must work hard to save their culture in order to 
maintain this security.  They have further stressed that contact with urban areas will lead 
to the destruction of the traditional Fijian structure.  However, the increased importance 
of money has forced eastern Fijians out of isolated rural communities to look for work in 
more populated areas.  Money is required to pay for things such as food, water, 
electricity, and community fundraisers.  Money is also something that is not easily 
accessible to eastern Fijians.  While Appendix III shows that the labour force is greater 
on the western edge of Vanua Levu, it should be noted that 70-78% of the labour force is 
engaged in subsistence agriculture.273  Although this may sound positive, it is not.  The 
prevalent industries in Fiji are the sugar industry (which is predominant on the western 
island of Viti Levu), tourism and the garment industry, located in urban centres.274  
Appendix IV shows that the lowest three of the lowest four Provinces in terms of weekly 
income are from the east.  Appendix V illustrates that the average rural villager requires 
approximately $115 to survive.  The result is that many Fijians live on $2-4 a day, with 
the income shortfall for basics needs at $83 in rural parts and $100 in urban areas.275   
And as illustrated in Appendix VI, prices of basic goods continue to increase.  Adding to 
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such pressures is the fact that approximately 30-60% of the disposable income of rural 
Fijians is taken up by Church and village obligations.276  The consequence of this is that 
35% of Fijian villagers fall below the poverty line, as defined by the United Nations (see 
Appendices VII and VIII).  
 In one survey, eastern rural Fijians suggested that the quality of their houses, lack 
of income, and high levels of indebtedness took priority.277  Moreover, an Asian 
Development Bank Survey (ADB) found that rural Fijians wanted the lack of facilities to 
be addressed. For example, four of ten rural communities surveyed had immediate 
access to health care, while the rest had to walk an average of 1-3 hours or more to 
access such facilities.278  Another survey found that 54% of respondents wanted more 
steps to be taken to help alleviate social problems, including those of poverty.279   As 
highlighted in Appendix IX, many eastern Fijians move to town because they believe 
that urban areas provide more opportunities.  Approximately 47% (according to 1996 
figures) of the population go to urban areas to look for work, 52% percent of whom look 
for opportunities in the Suva area.280  Moreover, 1996 figures indicate that 
approximately 158,160 Fijians have permanently relocated to urban areas, while 230,979 
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live in rural areas.281  Appendices X and XI give a further breakdown of the population 
in Fiji. 
 However, life in the city has not lived up to expectations given the high 
unemployment and over-crowded conditions of cities.282  One consequence is that many 
who cannot find jobs as wage labourers have looked to the informal economic sector for 
jobs.  As Reddy, Naidu and Mohanty found approximately 51% of respondents living in 
Suva became involved in this sector because the belief is that they will make more 
money.283  Survey results indicate that incomes for many have actually dropped and 
conditions have become worse (see Appendices XII and XIII).  Lack of education comes 
into play here.  While an increasing number of Fijian students are being educated, many 
do not attend school past the primary level (which is Grade 8) (highlighted in 
Appendices XIV- XVI).   Fijians have been taught that education will lead to permanent 
re-location to the city, meaning that one will forget about their rural roots and 
heritage.284  Therefore, many rural Fijians have come to believe that education will lead 
to the corrupting of their culture and values.285  This is illustrated by a 1996 figure that 
highlighted that approximately 6400 secondary level students were dropping out of 
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school, a number expected to rise.286  The result of this is that many Fijians who relocate 
to urban centers do not have the skills to enter modern sectors of the economy.  As 
survey results indicate, their level of education is low, and many end up entering some 
form of agricultural activity within the economy (as highlighted in Appendices XVII and 
XVIII).   
 Lacking modern skills many Fijians live in squatter settlements with Suva seeing 
the greatest increase in such communities (see Appendix XIX).   Those that end up 
living in squatter settlements do so because of a lack of steady employment and the high 
costs of urban life (highlighted in Appendix XX).  The government estimates that the 
number of squatter settlements is expected to rise by the end of 2005, suggesting that 
urban areas will see approximately 13,725 families living in squatter settlements, of 
which approximately 6309 will be Fijian.287  Appendix XXI shows that squatter 
settlements, which fall under the designation of inferior housing, suffer from having no 
electricity, unsafe water, and poor sanitation.  Many people cannot afford life in town. 
They are unemployed and extended families cannot support the numbers of relations 
living in their homes.  It has been stressed that the notion of the extended family unit has 
not decreased with the onset of people moving to urban areas.288  The notion of the 
survival of the extended family leads many poor Fijian households to continue to 
support older members (see Appendix XXII).  However, there is now evidence to 
suggest that the prevalence of poverty is changing this network of support.  Poorer 
families are living in more nuclear units (illustrated in Appendices XXIII and XIV).  
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These statistics are further supported by the responses to the 2002-2003 Urban 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey which showed that a vast majority of 
respondents could not afford many of the basics of life, including medical care and 
health services (see Appendices XXV-XXVII).  Additionally, a survey conducted in 
2000 found that 80% of respondents wanted poverty alleviation to become the number 
one political priority because it was so negatively affecting their lives.289 
NGOs and Poverty Alleviation 
 It was suggested earlier in the chapter that the NGOs are considered to be major 
players in the developing world because they have a better capacity to deliver services 
that others do not.  So do NGOs play any role in poverty alleviation?  The answer is not 
really.  This was reflected in an Asian Development Bank (ADB) survey which found 
that over 40% of communities were not aware of any efforts to battle poverty.290  The 
government’s role in poverty alleviation has been minimal.291  The government has 
engaged in some initiatives such as “village beautification projects” for rural areas to 
help provide things such as clean water.292  However, the impact of such programs is not 
great because, as claimed by Prime Minister Qarase in a May 12, 2005 speech, the 
governments of the developing world do not have the resources to alleviate poverty.293  
This concession is surprising given the fact that the elite have justified affirmative action 
programs as necessary to alleviate poverty. What it does is add more suspicion on the 
                                                 
289 Christianity, Poverty & Wealth in the 21st Century,” The FCC-Research Group, August, 2000, 
http://www.aprodev.net/files/CPW/Fiji.pdf  (29 June 2005), 25.  
290 Asian Development Bank, “Priorities of the People: Hardship in the Fiji Islands,” September 2003,” 
14. 
291 Government of Fiji, “Government aims to reduce Poverty by 5%- Minister,” 8 July 2005, 
http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_4941.shtml  (14 July 2005). 
292 Government of Fiji, “Government’s Village Improvement Scheme to Continue, 
http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_1946.shtml  (31 May 2005). 
293Government of Fiji, “Hon. Qarase- Inaugural address at the 28th ADFIAP Annualy Conference,” 
http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/printer_4594.shtml  (18 July 2005) 
 68
government as to who really benefits from these programs.  However, claims such as the 
one made by Qarase encourage NGOs to participate in the developing world.294  NGOs 
have focused their attention on advocacy and institution-building in partnership with the 
state.295  The belief is that institutional changes are necessary because current structures 
exclude the majority of the population from development.296  Therefore, institutional 
structures must be changed in order for progress to be made.297  Furthermore, such 
initiatives will increase participation at the grassroots level, thus giving ordinary Fijians 
a voice.  By improving government strategies and capacities, NGOs argue that more 
people will be able to fully participate in modern society, meaning that Fijian leaders can 
be held more accountable for their actions as well.298    Thus, a great deal of activities 
carried out by NGOs with regard to poverty alleviation deals with democracy 
promotion.299  The United Nations, especially the UNDP and UNESCAP, have stressed 
the importance of de-centralization of power away from the Federal Government while 
incorporating rural villages into the existing municipalities.  The term used to describe 
such programs is sustainable human development, where the belief is that local 
governance and participation will enhance the quality of life by establishing good 
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governance and economic development.300  It is further argued that de-centralization will 
give citizens the initiative to advance and become more productive because they will 
have a stake in the system. 301  NGOs believe they must set the example for states and 
individuals in terms of what strategies and initiatives must be taken for people to 
progress.302  ECREA is another NGO involved in the field of democracy-promotion.  
Their mission is “motivated by Jesus Christ’s vision, to nurture and build a 
compassionate, just and inclusive society.”303  However, much of their mandate is trying 
to empower ordinary Fijians so they feel more confident to participate in society and 
overcome the problems associated with poverty. 304  For example, Koila Costello-Olsson 
of ECREA has mentioned that Fijians must speak out against their elite because 
instability holds the people back.305  In a separate ECREA presentation, Aisake Casimira 
suggested that by empowering the Fijian grassroots, they will be able to discover that 
appeals to traditional culture by the Fijian elite helps the elite to maintain their power 
and privilege.306  What is seen is that there is a contradiction in priorities.  Ordinary 
Fijians want direct measures to be taken to alleviate poverty, while NGOs place focus on 
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democratic reform, arguing that such changes will give the Fijian grassroots a better 
chance of overcoming their poverty.  As Claire Mercer highlights, NGOs struggle in 
their operations because of the conflict between the scale of their activities and what the 
people of the developing world want.307  The feeling at the grassroots level is that NGOs 
are oversimplifying problems by claiming that democracy and a vibrant civil society will 
help to alleviate poverty.308  What is illustrated here is that while Fijians, especially 
eastern Fijians, need services, the government either suggests that the problem is not that 
bad or that little can be done given financial constraints whereas the NGOs concentrate 
on building up strategies.309  
 Such NGO activities are encouraged by donors as well.  The reason is that 
donors fund NGOs on a selective basis as to promote their vision of how a country 
should be run.310   The consequence of this is that NGOs operate in specified sectors, 
most notably democracy promotion.311  For example, AUSAID targets almost 40% of its 
funding on initiatives of governance and state capacity building.312 Additionally, the 
ADB has approved three technical assistance grants for 2005 “totalling US$895,000 for 
strengthening public sector banking and cash management, reviewing the fisheries 
sector, and road improvements.”313  But, funds for initiatives to directly battle poverty 
alleviation are not included.   The net effect of this is that ordinary Fijians continue to 
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struggle with poverty.  What this does is it increases frustration amongst the Fijian 
grassroots, which leads to the continuation of certain stereotypes which will be discussed 
later. 
Gender 
 Gender has increasingly become a significant issue. The patriarchal culture of 
Fijian society constrains women severely.  One basic premise of Fijian culture is that the 
essence of women is more child-like.314  Therefore, they must be constrained because 
the “immature” nature of their souls leads to their inability to contain themselves within 
societal boundaries.315  This is used as justification for male dominance over women.  
For example, one aspect of Fijian marriage is that in the first five years of marriage, 
couples fight a great deal so that husbands establish their authority and dominance over 
their wives.316    As one woman stated in an interview, “…I can't do anything, so I have 
to listen to him because he's my husband.”317  Another example is the continuation of the 
custom of bulubulu, which is done after the rape of a woman.  This is where the 
transgressor could (and usually does) go to the victim’s father with yaqona and 
apologize for his actions, with the expectation (and usually the reality being) that the 
father will forgive him for his actions.318  The woman has no say in the matter.  
Moreover, the aftermath of the 2000 coup has made women more prone to male 
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authority and violence.319  Winston Halapua states that this is a result of a ‘militaristic’ 
state of mind whereby those with authority can legitimately discipline anyone being 
‘disobedient.’320  Moving to cities has not really alleviated the struggles women face in 
their day-to-day activities.  In one survey, a woman iterated how women are often forced 
and encouraged into prostitution by the male heads of the family to increase family 
income.321  Another survey found that poor women continue to suffer from the rigidities 
of the patriarchal structure the most since poor families give males the first chance to get 
an education, which limits the amount of skills that women possess.322  As one woman 
interviewed by the NGO fem’LINK Pacific states, “…we aren’t given access to make 
big decisions…and our [capacities are]…ignored.”323  The overall concern is the 
tendency for men to establish their authority and dominance as the head of the unit. 324  
The resulting domestic abuse is reflected in statistics such as those shown in Appendix 
XXVIII.  Women also continue to be disempowered by government legislation and 
institutional practices that have not been brought up to date in order to adequately 
protect women.325  For example, in the rare cases where women report abuses to the 
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authorities, women are blamed by the courts for causing the abuses they face.326    This 
leads to the continuing prevalence of violence against women.  Statistics show a 
continuous increase in domestic violence.  The Fiji Times reported that between 1997 
and 2001, there had been a twenty-four percent increase in the number of reported cases 
of violence against women (2261 reported cases in 2001 compared to 1722 in 1997).327  
Many cases go unreported because Fijian women feel constrained to speak out against 
their victimization.  This is the consequence of the prevailing attitude amongst many 
Fijian women coming to believe that they are confined by their gender.328  This has led 
to the development of women’s NGOs which endeavour to empower women. As 
highlighted in the last section on poverty, many NGOs focus on institutional change as 
the way to bring about change.  What has been found with regards to women issues is 
that while attention is placed on advocacy, the grassroots are more involved in initiatives 
taken by women’s NGOs.   
Gender Issues and NGOs 
     The Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM) is a multi-ethnic women’s NGO 
that was established around the time of the 1987 Coup.  The FWRM shifted its focus 
from service delivery to democracy promotion for two reasons: 1- the belief that 
democracy is the necessary pre-condition for women’s rights to evolve; 2- Fijian women 
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(from all ethnic backgrounds) can create problems on racially divisive issues.329   
FWRM’s mandate is to help to empower women through institutional changes. The 
belief is that the restoration of democracy is the only way institutional changes can be 
made.330  This mandate may seem problematic, because as highlighted in the section on 
poverty, many Fijians require direct aid to help them to overcome their struggle.  In 
conducting its activities, the FWRM has worked more with those at the elite level, 
including the Ministry of Labour and Industrial Relations, and with the Law Reform 
Commission.  For example, the FWRM has lobbied government officials to review the 
patriarchal nature of the criminal justice system so that women feel confident to report 
cases of violence. 331  The FWRM has also lobbied the Fiji Law Reform Commission 
(FLRC) to recommend changes in the criminal justice system as to address the problems 
discussed above.  Such initiatives have had some success.  For example, the FLRC 
recommended changes to many laws in their 1999 Sexual Offences Report to the 
Attorney General.332 The FWRM campaigned to reform legislation to give women more 
protection under the law.333  A decade long struggle finally led to the passing of the 
Family Law Bill in 2003 (a bill that is to come into effect in December 2005).334  Some 
of the particulars of this bill include: putting more emphasis on the nuclear family unit; 
giving more protection to women and children under the law; and giving women more 
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rights with regard to matrimonial property.335  While these changes are few in number, 
they are significant because higher authorities have begun to recognize the need to 
protect women’s rights. 
   The Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) is another multi-ethnic women’s NGO.  
The FWCC has been hailed as one of the more effective women’s NGOs in Fiji because 
it has struck a balance between efforts directed at the grassroots level and those directed 
at the institutional level.  First established in 1984 as a rape crisis centre, the FWCC’s 
mandate has evolved to include working with officials at the elite level to help develop 
initiatives to empower women.336  The FWCC continues to offer counselling services to 
female victims of violence which now has come to include mobile counselling clinics, 
telephone counselling (which can be accessed 24-hours a day), and on-line 
counselling.337   Mobile counselling is one of the bigger moves because Fijian women 
living in rural parts have greater access to these services. Most Fijian women located in 
rural areas will not attend workshops located in urban areas because of the expense.338    
Although offices are based in the urban areas, they are making efforts to reach out to the 
grassroots.339  The FWCC has also placed its focus on creating public awareness on 
women’s rights.  One program of the FWCC is the “Male Advocacy Training 
Workshop,” a program whose intent is to educate men to be more sensitive to women’s 
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issues. 340   Additionally, the “16 Days of Activism,” a program that has been operating 
since the early 1990s, is designed to gather support for Fijian women’s human rights.341  
These campaigns have drawn some criticism from the government because the FWCC 
has used the media to convey its message, while the government prefers a quieter 
diplomatic approach.342  In spite of such criticisms, the FWCC has endeavoured to work 
with the government to help improve conditions for Fijian women.  These efforts have 
included monitoring implementation of laws and sentencing, participating in 
government working groups on policy programmes and legislative reform, and using 
action research for its services and programs.343  These efforts have been praised by the 
current Minister for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, who congratulated 
the FWCC for its efforts in providing support services for victims of assault and 
violence, and helping to facilitate debates.344    
 Fem’LINK Pacific is another women’s NGO operating in Fiji that is multi-ethnic 
in composition.  Established after the 2000 coup, the Suva-based fem’LINK aims to 
empower women by encouraging them to use the media to give a uniquely female 
perspective on issues.345  The belief is that women’s issues are not heard in the media, 
and such initiatives will make their voices heard, thus leading to change.346  It was noted 
by the director of fem’LINK that only 18% of total daily media coverage deals with 
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women, and much of that coverage depicts women in a negative or sexual manner.347  
While the focus is on women, fem’LINK has also articulated that it hopes to create 
awareness amongst all groups that they face the same problems in terms of social, 
political and economic development issues, and its activities illustrate such visions.348  
 The concern that has been brought up is that most Fijians cannot afford to access 
many forms of media, so how will they be exposed to the issues raised in such 
initiatives. One answer to this question is that fem’LINK travels to all parts of the 
country to help with the set-up and facilitation of women’s discussion groups.  Their 
discussions are then video-taped and sent to various discussion groups held by other 
women’s NGOs.349  The hope is that these participants will discover the values, concerns 
and visions they have in common. 350 Groups like the FWCC have used these videos in 
community outreach programs, showing that fem’LINK is targeting women from all 
walks of life.351   
 Fem’LINK has also taken advantage of the prevalence of radio amongst Fijians 
(highlighted in Appendix XXIX) in starting a radio broadcast using “suit-case radio 
technology, thus allowing for mobility in terms of location of broadcast.”352  The 
initiative is known as Fem’TALK 89.2 FM, and was started in mid-2004. 353   This radio 
program broadcasts approximately once a month, and endeavours to generate public 
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awareness of issues concerning women, youth, and even men.354  The hope is that with 
diverse viewpoints being presented, it will help Fijians to discover they have common 
values and concerns with the other groups. 355  Another hope is that by including a wide 
variety of perspectives, public awareness about the different cultures and initiatives will 
also increase.356  Furthermore, the program is designed to bring to light that women of 
all ethnic backgrounds have common issues that need to be addressed.357  Just to put this 
into context, the August 2004 broadcast included ECREA, youth groups, as well as 
members of other faiths.  Fem’LINK also publishes monthly e-news bulletin 
“fem’TALK,” which highlights the activities of fem’LINK and other women’s 
organizations.  However, with access to the internet plaguing many Fijians (highlighted 
in Appendix XVIII), its reach within Fiji is constrained.     
 ECREA is a Christian organization that also endeavours to empower Fijian 
women.  ECREA’s activities are guided by four principles: social justice, integral human 
development, servant leadership and participation.358  ECREA runs a Gender and Peace 
Program, which targets women, men and youth in effort to create a culture of peace, 
justice and reconciliation in religious and social institutions.359  One particular workshop 
held under this theme area was Towards a Culture of Peace, held in 2001.  Its purpose 
was to bring people from a variety of backgrounds together to discuss ways to empower 
women.360  What this program found was that the reach of NGOs was limited.361  Many 
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participants congratulated ECREA for setting up this initiative leading to a second 
workshop. The second workshop broadened its target audience with the hope that it 
would further facilitate dialogue amongst women of all groups and lead to the realization 
that they share common concerns.362  ECREA also runs other programs to deal with 
women’s issues.  A Woman and Communication Program was set up in 2000, which ran 
from July 2000 to November 2002.  The aim of this program was to train and develop 
the abilities of men and women to identify barriers to communication, and bring people 
from all ethnic backgrounds together.363  ECREA also set up a Peace Research Program 
(which ran between June 2001 and November 2002) whose objective was to bring to 
light the role of cultural and religious symbolism in the lives of individual Fijians (in the 
broad sense of the term).364  With the help of a fem’LINK video, this session found that 
women of all groups were very willing to discuss the impact of the Coup on them and 
their families.365   
 These are highlights of some of the programs that women’s NGOs are engaged 
in to help women overcome their struggles.  While there are women’s NGOs that 
concentrate on advocacy, such as the FWRM, women’s issues are being brought to the 
forefront.  The consequence of this is that women are speaking up about their plight for 
the first time.   
Is Ethnonationalism even a Factor?  Discussion  
 In light of the discussion thus far, the question that arises is, are the eastern Fijian 
grassroots active participants in the promotion of ethno-nationalism?  The assessment 
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made is that generally, ordinary Fijians, including those from the east, do not participate 
in discussions on ethno-nationalism. 
 This is not to say that Fijians do not harbour negative attitudes towards Indo-
Fijians.  There has been some documentation that Fijians blame Indo-Fijians for their 
poverty.  For example, a 2000 survey found that 51% of respondents felt that the 
wealthy, highlighted as being selfish, were to blame for the poverty of the Fijian 
people.366  The same survey found that 35% of respondents stressed that the rich were 
not following teachings in the Bible about sharing with the poor.367  These results are 
surprising given that Indo-Fijians are generally worse off than Fijians.  While it cannot 
be denied that some Indo-Fijians are better off than others, approximately 31% of Indo-
Fijians were below the poverty line in the 1990s, compared to 27.7% of ethnic Fijians.368  
Appendix XIII shows the conditions that Indo-Fijians (who live in rural settlements) 
endure worse conditions than their Fijian counterparts.  As Appendix XXX shows, 
Fijians at the bottom of the scale generally make more than Indo-Fijians.  Appendix 
XXXI shows that Fijians in the poorest areas are generally better off than the poorest of 
Indo-Fijians.   
 Additionally, some polls suggest that support for Fijian leaders remains, but they 
want the country to move forward as well.  Pollsters such as the Tebbutt Times and the 
internet-based Fijilive regularly conduct surveys to find out the reaction of Fijians to 
various issues including that of ethno-nationalism.  For example, the Tebbutt Times 
most recently conducted three separate surveys of urban Fijians to gather their reaction 
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on the recent Unity Bill, which would re-classify certain crimes committed by coup 
leaders as politically-motivated, thus making them eligible for amnesty.369    One poll 
found that 55% of urban Fijians polled supported the Bill, believing that it would help 
the country move forward.370  However, most Fijians do not have access to the internet 
(as illustrated in Appendix XXIX).  Additionally, urban polls must be treated with 
caution because there is no indication of who is polled, and how they are polled.  
 In spite of these sentiments, ordinary Fijians do not participate in the ethno-
nationalistic debates.  The voices of ordinary Fijians are relatively silenced, as discussed 
earlier in the section on traditional village life.  This means that even during elections, 
ordinary Fijians, including those from the east, are manipulated into voting a particular 
way.371  For example, Fijians have traditionally been told how to vote, and who to vote 
for under the AV voting system.372  Additionally, there have been reports that some have 
even been threatened if they did not vote a certain way.373   
 However, the debate on ethno-nationalism involves a few other participants.  
Indo-Fijian leaders, as well as FLP members may also be considered to be participants in 
the debate on ethno-nationalism.  For example, their protests, discussed in chapters 1 
and 2, have been directed at how other groups, most notably the Indo-Fijians, are hurt by 
things such as land legislation.  Additionally, they have argued that the Fijian elite have 
used national institutions to expand their wealth at the expense of ordinary Fijians.   
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 The Fijian elite and NGOs are involved in these deliberations.  Chapters 1 & 2 
highlighted the views of the Fijian elite.  What is generally seen is that the Fijian elite 
have resorted to ethno-nationalism in order to cover up other issues facing the Fijian 
grassroots.  NGOs have generally responded to these issues.  Many initiatives have 
followed the logic that empowering Fijians can only occur through institutional change.  
By building the capacities of the Fijian grassroots, including those from the east, NGOs 
argue that Fijian commoners will be able to look at all issues more objectively.  The 
implication of such efforts is that governance issues will lead to reforms in other areas.  
Moreover, without proper governance structures in place, the voices of the Fijian 
grassroots will continue to be suppressed.   Therefore, NGOs endeavour to get the views 
of ordinary Fijians heard.  The Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF) is one NGO 
involved in the debate on ethno-nationalism.  The CCF has promoted a people-based 
process to establish a constitutional agenda (amongst other things) based on national 
issues and consensus.374  One of its initiatives has been to criticize the Qarase 
government’s reconciliation program.375  With the current proposed Reconciliation bill, 
the CCF has argued that it does not follow the principles of consensual decision-making, 
justice, wrongdoer contrition, and victim empowerment.376  Additionally, they argue that 
only the Fijian elite would be involved in the reconciliation process if the bill is passed 
in its present form, thus excluding other participants including the Fijian grassroots.377   
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Conclusion 
 Poverty and Gender issues are two of the biggest challenges that the Fijian 
grassroots face, with poverty being the biggest issue. Eastern rural Fijians are more 
prone to these phenomena, which are caused by a variety of factors.  Economic factors, 
including increased dependency on money to pay for things such as communal 
obligations, as well as a lack of job opportunities, have increased the seriousness of 
poverty.  Additionally, the village life and its structures have had a negative impact.  
While education is discouraged because of the threat it poses to the Fijian culture, 
participation in subsistence agriculture and maintaining one’s obligations to the village 
are generally encouraged.  Urban areas are attractive because Fijian commoners perceive 
them to be economic havens.  However, this has not been the case, as wages do not keep 
up with rising expenses.  The consequence is the rise in squatter settlements in urban 
centers and a decreasing quality of life. 
 Women’s rights have emerged to become a key issue as well.  Fijian culture 
teaches that men are the dominant sex, which has led to increased violence against 
women.  The consequence is that women are further disempowered, and are more prone 
to violence. However, the grassroots and NGOs disagree over how poverty can best be 
alleviated.  The grassroots believe that poverty can only be alleviated through direct 
measures.  On the other hand, NGOs generally believe that institutional reform will be 
more effective in alleviating poverty, because it will give the grassroots the capacities to 
rise up from the conditions they currently suffer.  While women’s NGOs also place 
some focus on advocacy, they are generally more involved with the grassroots.   
 However, the Fijian grassroots are generally quiet on issues of ethnic 
accommodation.  While stereotypes exist, ethno-nationalism is not the only issue facing 
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Fijians.  Responses to ethno-nationalism are generally made by NGOs.   This is because 
addressing poverty and gender issues are the biggest priorities of the grassroots. 
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Concluding Chapter 
Overview of Thesis Objectives  
 The handover of Fiji by eastern chiefs to the British effectively placed them in a 
position of great power over all Fijians.  Although the composition of the Fijian elite has 
been broadened to include top bureaucrats, military personnel and other politicians 
(including those from the west), eastern chiefs continue to maintain substantial control 
over the Fijian grassroots.  Their role has been further solidified by the constitutional 
entrenchment of the eastern-dominated Great Council of Chiefs whose powers include 
the authority to select the President.  It has been argued that the chiefs must maintain 
their authority over Fijians, because only they have the ability to fend off threats to the 
Fijian culture.  This rhetoric implies that the Fijian grassroots whole-heartedly follow 
their chiefs say in part because of chiefly claims to traditional authority.  Therefore, the 
thesis endeavoured to find out exactly what is occurring amongst the Fijian grassroots .  
The study focused on the eastern Fijian grassroots to determine if they were as strong in 
their beliefs about ethno-nationalism as their elite, whose power was entrenched at 
Cession.  Additionally, the thesis was also designed to see whether or not this issue is 
their primary pre-occupation.  This study focused on three main areas.  One area 
investigated was the influence of the colonial legacy on the Fijian way of life and if that 
legacy continues to have an effect today.   A second area revolved around the attitudes 
of Fijian commoners and whether or not they are active players in the promotion of 
ethno-nationalism.  A third area of investigation has looked into the role of some of the 
 86
relevant non-governmental organizations (now to be referred to as NGO’s) operating in 
Fiji, and whether or not they have any effect on ordinary Fijians.      
Conclusions and Synthesis of Major Findings 
Main Conclusion 
 The main conclusion reached is that while stereotypes and biases that are ethno-
nationalistic in nature exist amongst eastern Fijians, there are other challenges that they 
face, and ones they want addressed.  Poverty is one of the bigger issues that Fijians 
highlight as requiring attention.  The other issue is that of gender, including violence 
against women.  Modern times have made money more important, as it is needed to buy 
items such as food and electricity.  Additionally, money is required to keep up with 
communal obligations, which adds further pressure on the limited resources that rural 
Fijians possess.  The result is that their quality of life, including the quality of their 
homes and sanitary conditions, are affected.  The eastern parts of Fiji also provide fewer 
economic opportunities with subsistence agriculture being a staple of the eastern Fijian 
economy.  This leads many to move to urban areas as the perception is that urban areas 
provide better opportunities and a chance of a better life.  However, conditions that most 
eastern Fijians endure in urban areas are not much better than a life of subsistence in 
isolated villages.  Jobs are difficult to find, and expenses are higher in urban areas.  The 
result is that many are forced to live in squatter settlements.  Conditions in these 
settlements are poor; commoners endure, amongst other things, unsanitary conditions 
and houses of poor quality.  Gender issues, especially violence against women, have 
become more prevalent.  Reported cases of domestic violence continue to increase 
which affects the quality of life that women can enjoy.  In addition to enduring poverty, 
they must also accept the authority of male members of Fijian society.  The dominance 
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of men is so great, women feel that they are confined and defined by their gender.  As a 
result, they feel disempowered.  
Synthesis and Conclusions by Focus Areas 
 The entrenchment of traditional institutions and attitudes affects the progress of 
Fijians.  Since colonial times, the Fijian grassroots have been taught that civilized 
Christians obey authority figures because those with authority possess more knowledge 
than commoners. Additionally, authority figures know what is best for their people, thus 
increasing the necessity of obeying them.  One effect is that Fijians do not want to 
engage in activities that will affect the workings of their culture.  This effect is most 
notably seen in how much they value education.  Although there are an increasing 
number of Fijians that place more emphasis on education, many still view education 
suspiciously, because it is seen as a corrosive influence.  Rather, dependence on things 
such as subsistence agriculture is encouraged especially in eastern Fiji. The effect is that 
they have limited skills, affecting their access to jobs.  With more Fijians, especially 
those from the east, moving to town in hopes of finding a better quality of life, this 
affects what jobs they can apply for because they have limited transferable skills.  The 
net effect is that many cannot afford to live in town, illustrated by the increase in 
squatter settlements.  A second inference made is that the principles of hierarchy and 
paternalism also continue to affect Fijians.  Rank, age and sex are very important in 
Fijian society.  One area that this is reflected in is women’s issues, as women continue to 
face male domination.  This is illustrated in the rising level of violence against women.  
This is also highlighted by the fact that women are generally reluctant to speak out 
against their victimization. A further example is that poor Fijian families give males first 
chance at an education.  Fijian society teaches that paternalism and hierarchy must be 
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adhered to in order for the Fijian culture to survive.  And because rural villages are 
considered to be the social security of the Fijian people, many accept such principles.  
However, they also want poverty to be addressed because it is seen as affecting their 
capability to survive.  The indication here is there is a strain in one’s acceptance of the 
traditional way of life, but generally the traditional structures are still strong. 
 Ethno-nationalism has been used by the Fijian elite who claim that everything 
has to be done to thwart the threat posed by Indo-Fijians to the Fijian culture. 
This implies that Fijians are active participants in the promotion of ethno-nationalism.  
However, research has found otherwise.  Eastern Fijians, while harbouring certain 
stereotypes that are ethno-nationalistic in nature, do not say much about the issue, 
focusing their attentions more on their poverty. This is not to say that their poverty is not 
blamed on Indo-Fijians.  Many eastern Fijians still harbour the stereotype that Indo-
Fijians are wealthier than them.  Additionally, some believe that Indo-Fijians are 
hoarding their wealth thus adding to the pressures faced by poor Fijians.  In spite of this, 
more attention is placed on their quality of life.  The basic problem here is that many 
Fijians have not realized that poverty, and even gender issues, are cross-cutting.  The 
general trend is that the debate over ethno-nationalism involves the Fijian elite, Indo-
Fijian leaders, members of parties such as the FLP, and NGOs.  As highlighted in 
chapter three, NGOs place a great deal of emphasis on institutional reform.  The view is 
that the Fijian elite use ethno-nationalism to manipulate ordinary Fijians.  This is 
illustrated during times such as elections, when Fijians are told how to vote, and who to 
vote for.  Thus, initiatives must be taken to first change the culture of state institutions.  
Indo-Fijian leaders and members of the FLP have called for things such as land 
legislation to be reformed, as to give Indo-Fijians more security in the country.  The net 
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result is that the outward ethno-nationalist sentiments are a mask for the poverty that 
they face.   
 The priorities of NGOs and eastern Fijians conflict in areas like poverty.  Many 
NGOs believe that poverty alleviation can occur only through changes in the 
institutional framework of the country.  Therefore, democracy promotion has become a 
major focus of NGOs.  De-centralization of government authority is one particular 
initiative taken by NGOs which assumes that increased participation in the system will 
empower Fijian commoners to pull themselves out of poverty.  Fijians, especially those 
in the east, want direct services to be provided to help improve their quality of life.  In 
defence of NGOs, their activities are constrained by donors, whose vision is that 
governance issues are a priority.  However, this is where communication is important, 
because the grassroots and NGOs must be on the same page.  The reach of NGOs affects 
the level of influence they have on Fijian commoners.  Poverty alleviation initiatives 
have not helped the Fijian grassroots as poverty continues to increase.  However, as 
illustrated in the section on Gender issues in chapter three, the influence of NGOs 
becomes greater if they reach out to the more remote areas.  This is reflected by the fact 
that an increasing number of women at the rural level are speaking out about their plight.  
Previously, most women’s NGOs held workshops in urban areas, thus making them 
inaccessible for many Fijian women.  To go to these workshops, women require money 
for transport.  And as discussed, money is hard to come by for most Fijians.  Therefore, 
most women were reluctant to even consider attending such workshops.  But with more 
women’s NGOs reaching out to the remote areas, more women are speaking out about 
their plight.  While violence still affects women, the general trend is that they are more 
willing to speak up. NGOs operating in Fiji have had some success in empowering 
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Fijian commoners through the introduction of new ideas.  And while they face many 
challenges, they have made some progress.  This is encouraging because it means that 
Fijian commoners want to become active players in the conditions that plague them.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 This study has revealed that issues other than ethno-nationalism require attention 
in Fiji.  And while ethno-nationalism is not the primary pre-occupation of Fijian 
commoners, some stereotypes still exist, such as all Indo-Fijians being wealthy.  
However, many of the problems plaguing Fijian commoners are cross-cutting in nature.  
Therefore, the following are suggestions for future research. 
 One area that can be further explored is the role of women’s NGOs in reducing 
stereotypes between Fijians and Indo-Fijians.  This thesis highlighted that many NGOs 
are multi-ethnic in nature.  Additionally, women’s NGOs are beginning to hold some 
multi-ethnic workshops.  While some of the successes were highlighted, further research 
is required.  For example, attention could focus on how direct contact between the 
various members affects social relations and perceptions of each group.  
 Another area that can be further explored is whether or not there are changes 
being made in the education system to change attitudes amongst Fijian commoners.  
This could involve exploring things like teacher’s attitudes, and the role that teacher 
training may have in the education system.  Additionally, the culture of the education 
system could be considered: To what extent does the education of Fijians foster ethnic 
division? 
 These are just a couple of suggestions.  They are meant to highlight that many 
issues that plague Fijian commoners are cross-cutting in nature.  Bringing this revelation 
to light may not have an immediate effect, but such revelations could be passed on to 
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future generations.  This can help reduce the general ethnic segregation and divide seen 
in Fiji.  
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Map of Fiji 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fiji Islands Visitor’s Bureau, “Map of Fiji,” http://www.fijifvb.gov.fj/about/geograph/map.shtml  
(9 July 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93
Appendices 
 
 
Appendix I: Comparison of Seat Allocation in the House of Representatives 
between the 1996 CRC and the 1997 Constitution 
 
CRC (1996) Recommended Allocation of Seats in the House of Representatives 
 
Reserved Seats    
Fijians (including 
Pacific Islanders)  
12  
Indo-Fijians  10  
General Voters  2  
Rotumans  1  
Open Seats  45  
TOTAL  70  
 
 
Allocation of Seats in the House of Representatives under the 1997 Constitution 
 
Reserved Seats    
Fijians (including Pacific 
Islanders) 
23  
Indo-Fijians 19  
General Voters 3  
Rotumans 1  
Open Seats 25  
TOTAL 71  
 
Source: Government of Australia, Dr. Stephen Sherlock, “Constitutional and Political Change in Fiji,” 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1997-98/98rp97.htm   (14 March 2005). 
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Appendix II: Population by Religion and by Race - 1996 Census of Population 
Ethnicity     Total Fijian Indian Other
Total 775,077 393,575 338,818 42,684
Anglican 6,325 2,508 1,208 2,609
Apostolic 2,593 2,237 250 106
Assembly of God 31,072 24,717 4,620 1,735
Baptist 1,296 695 382 219
Catholic 69,320 52,163 3,520 13,637
CMF (Every home) 5,673 5,149 269 255
Gospel 1,354 618 514 222
Jehovah's Witness 6,102 4,815 486 801
Later Day Saints 3,475 2,253 633 589
Methodist 280,628 261,972 5,432 13,224
Presbyterian 383 105 90 188
Salvation Army 989 628 251 110
Seventh Day Adv 22,187 19,896 572 1,719
Other Christian 18,085 12,624 2,492 2,969
Arya Samaj 9,564 44 9,493 27
Kabir Panthi 118 43 73 2
Sanatan 193,927 551 193,061 315
Satya Sai Baba 60 7 52 1
Other Hindu 57,428 219 57,096 113
Sikh 3,076 0 3,076 0
Ahmadiya 1,976 18 1,944 14
Sunni 32,351 175 32,082 94
Other Moslem 19,996 131 19,727 138
Bahai 563 389 25 149
Confucian 365 8 21 336
Other 1,039 61 314 664
No religion, etc 5,132 1,549 1,135 2,448
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, 1996 Census of Population and Housing, (Government Printer, 
Suva), http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Social/religion.htm.  (8 June 2005). 
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Appendix III: Location of Labour Force 
Source: Association of National Census and Statistics Directors of America, Asia and the Pacific, 
“Utilization of Census Data: GIS Modelling, 1996 Census,” 
http://www.ancsdaap.org/cencon2002/papers/Fiji/Fiji.PDF.   (6 July 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96
Appendix IV: Average Weekly Household Income by Province 
Province Average 
Household 
Income (F$) 
 
Rewa 291  
Ra 220  
Ba 212  
Serua 191  
Macuata 186 * 
Naitasiri 182  
Lomaiviti 172  
Kadavu 170  
Tailevu 157  
Namosi 156  
Cakaudrove 152 * 
Bau 152 * 
Nadroga/Navosa 150  
Lau 130 * 
 
 
Source: Crosbie Walsh, “Poverty, Politics and the Politics of Race in Fiji,” 
http://www.devnet.org.nz/conf/Papers/walsh.pdf, (5 July 2005). 
 
*indicates the Provinces located in eastern Fiji 
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Appendix V: Poverty Lines by Area and Ethnicity ($F/week), 2002/2003 
 Food Poverty 
Line 
Basic Needs 
Poverty Line  
Food Costs as % 
of Basic Needs 
Urban 76.17 138.63 54.9 
Rural Settlement 73.99 115.42 64.1 
Rural Village 79.43 104.85 75.8 
Ethnic Fijian 80.12 128.99 62.1 
Ethnic Indian 70.04 132.38 52.9 
Others 80.12 128.99 62.1 
National 75.08 114.12 65.8 
Source: Ganesh Chand, “Overview of Current Economic Conditions in Fiji,” Global Policy Network, 
http://www.gpn.org/data/fiji/fiji-analysis.doc, (5 July 2005), 15. 
 
*Note- Rural Settlements are occupied by Indo-Fijians only, Rural Villages are occupied by Fijian 
commoners only. 
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Appendix VI: Consumer Price Index- (Base: 1993=100) 
 
  
Annual Average 
Inflation Rate All Items 
1994 0.6 100.8 
1995 2.2 103.0 
1996 3.1 106.1 
1997 3.4 109.7 
1998 5.7 116.0 
1999 2.0 118.3 
2000 1.1 119.6 
2001 4.3 124.7 
2002 0.8 125.6 
2003 4.2 130.9 
2004 2.8 134.6 
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, (Government Printer, Suva) 
http://www.spc.org.nc/prism/country/fj/stats/Economic/cpi.htm.  (9 June 2005). 
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Appendix VII: Population in Relative Poverty by Area, 1990-1991* 
 
 
 Total Urban Rural Village Rural 
Settlement 
Based on 
household 
income 
32.7 29.0 35.2 34.9 
Based on per 
capita 
household 
income 
37.6 31.2 43.6 39.7 
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
 
*denotes poverty defined as getting less than 50% of average household income 
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Appendix VIII: Population in Relative Poverty by Ethnicity, 1990-1991* 
 
 Total Fijian Indo-Fijian Other 
Based on 
household 
Income 
32.66 31.28 34.46 26.92 
Based on per 
capita 
household 
income 
37.61 36.59 36.61 36.05 
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
 
* denotes poverty defined as getting less than 50% of average household income. 
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Appendix IX: General Perceptions of Social and Economic Conditions of Migrant 
Heads of Households Before and After Migration, 1992-1993 
 
Source: Dharma Chandra, “Socio-demographic and Economic characteristics of Migrant Heads of 
Households and the Consequences of their Migration in Fiji, 1992-1993, Asia-Pacific Population Journal, 
Vol. 17 No. 1 (March 2002), http://www.unescape.org/esid/psis/population/journal/2002/v17n1dn.pdf, (20 
March 2005), 75. 
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Appendix X: Estimated Urban Population and Households by Ethnicity 
Population Division Total Households
Fijians  Indians Others 
Central/Eastern 47,105 114,856 91,425 21,660 
Northern 8,768 84,60 28,598 1,827 
Western 27,770 47,602 73,001 6,436 
 
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Urban Household and Income Survey, 2002-2003, (Government 
Printer, Suva) http://www.spc.int/prism/fjtest/HIES/household_income_and_expenditure.htm, (9 June 
2005). 
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Appendix XI: Households and Population by Ethnicity and Sector, 1986, 1996 
 
 
Source: Neelesh Gounder,  “Rural Urban Migration in Fiji: Causes and Consequences,”  University of the 
South Pacific, Department of Economics, Working Paper 2005/12. 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/files/schools/ssed/economics/working_papers/2005/wp2005_12.pdf  (8 
July 2005), 2. 
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Appendix XII: Gross Annual Income of Migrant Heads of Households by Sex, 
Before and After Migration, 1992-1993 
 
Source: Dharma Chandra, “Socio-demographic and Economic characteristics of Migrant Heads of 
Households and the Consequences of their Migration in Fiji, 1992-1993, Asia-Pacific Population Journal 
Vol. 17 No. 1 (March 2002), http://www.unescape.org/esid/psis/population/journal/2002/v17n1dn.pdf, (20 
March 2005), 71. 
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Appendix XIII: Housing Characteristics, 1996 (By Percent) 
 No Safe 
Water Source 
Use Pit 
Toilet 
No 
Electricity 
Use 
Kerosene for 
Lighting 
Use Wood 
for Cooking 
Fuel 
National 16.9 43.7 44.7 33.4 56.2 
Fijian 11.5 34.9 62.1 52.5 65.1 
Indo-Fijian 21.8 54.5 29.2 16.0 49.7 
Other 6.4 12.7 34.1 27.1 32.7 
Urban 2.5 23.3 18.2 12.8 18.4 
Rural Village 18.0 41.2 77.9 67.6 85.6 
Rural 
Settlement 
35.4 74.3 64.2 23.5 75.1 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Pacific Regional Department, and the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, “Fiji: Poverty Status Discussion Paper,” The Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 
http://www.spc.org.nc/Poverty%20Programme/Fiji%20poverty%20assessment.pdf, (13 July 2005), 14. 
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Appendix XIV: Gross Enrolment Ratio – Class 1-8: Ethnic Groups 
 
  Fijians   Indians   Others  
Year No in 
School 
Population Gross No in 
School
Population Gross No in 
School 
Population Gross 
 Class 1 
-8 
Aged 1-13 enrol 
ratio 
Class 1 
-8 
Aged 1-13 enrol 
ratio 
Class 1 
-8 
Aged 1-13 enrol 
ratio 
1996 82,120 75,566 108.67% 63,749 59,914 106.40% 6,933 7,344 94.40%
1997 83,777 76,920 101.59% 58,177 59,380 97.97% 6,461 7,400 87.31%
1998 86,227 78,301 110.12% 60,425 58,869 102.64% 6,698 7,449 89.92%
Source:  United Nations, “The EFA 2000 Assessment: Country Reports, Fiji, Education for All,” Statistics 
from the Ministry of Education. Department of Statistics Annual Report, 
http://www2.unesco.org/wef/countryreports/fiji/rapport_2.html, (13 July 2005). 
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Appendix XV:  
 
 
Source: Setsuo Otsuka, “Cultural Influences on Academic Achievement in Fiji”, The Australian 
Association for Research in Education, http://www.aare.edu.au/04pap/ots04633.pdf  (5 June 2005), p. 26. 
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Appendix XVI: Level of Formal Education by Gender, Ethnicity and Residence for 
People 15 years and over, 1989-90, (Figures as a percentage) 
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
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Appendix XVII: Informal Sector in Fiji 
 
Source: Mahendra Reddy, Vijay Naidu and Manoranjan Mohanty, “The Urban Informal Sector in Fiji: 
Results from a Survey,” Fijian Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1 (2003), 
http://www.fijianstudies.org/dload/vol1no1/urban_informal_sector.pdf, 136. 
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Appendix XVIII: Level of Education in the Informal Sector 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mahendra Reddy, Vijay Naidu and Manoranjan Mohanty, “The Urban Informal Sector in Fiji: 
Results from a Survey,” Fijian Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1 (2003), 
http://www.fijianstudies.org/dload/vol1no1/urban_informal_sector.pdf, 144. 
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Appendix XIX: Informal Dwellings in Fiji’s Urban Areas, 1996 
 
Urban Area Urban 
Village 
Squatter Settlement Peripheral* Total 
Dwellings 
Suva 1,641 5,163 - 210 7.034 
Lautoka 137 1,203 515 36 1,691 
Ba 69 159 166 64 516 
Labasa 66 471 - 131 696 
Levuka 118 100 - - 218 
Nadi 561 293 496 148 1,501 
Nausori 151 259 - 117 527 
Navua - - 52 - 52 
Rakiraki 25 138 151 - 314 
Savusavu 32 139 - 56 227 
Sigatoka 438 50 116 11 613 
Tavua 80 47 - - 127 
Vatukoula 30 226 - 83 336 
Korovou - 25 - - 25 
Nabouwalu 24 6 - - 30 
Pacific 
Harbour 
- - 42 - 42 
Seaqaqa - 14 - - 14 
Total 3,410 6,313 1,560 867 14,171 
 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
 
 
*Peripheral indicates houses that could not be classified as urban or rural 
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Appendix XX: Reasons for Living in Squatter Settlements 
 
Source: Abdul Hassan, “A Preliminary Study on the Supply of Low-Cost Housing in Fiji,” 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/landmgmt/pdf/4%20O%20Olock%20Forum%202005%20Abdul%20Hassan.pdf  (15 
July 2005), (15 July 2005), 14. 
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Appendix XXI: Conditions faced by Fijian Commoners, By Settlement Type 
 
Source: Crosbie Walsh, “Poverty, Politics and the Politics of Race in Fiji,” 
http://www.devnet.org.nz/conf/Papers/walsh.pdf,  (5 July 2005). 
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Appendix XXII: Household Income and Size, by Decile Grouping 
 
Ten 
Percent 
Group 
Average 
per capita 
weekly 
income 
Average 
number of 
working 
adults 
Average 
number of 
children 
Average 
dependency 
Average 
household 
size 
1 $11.10 1.4 1.5 0.94 4.1 
2 $17.20 *Number 
obstructed in 
source  
1.7 0.92 4.5 
3 $21.60 1.8 1.8 0.94 1.8 
4 $25.60 1.7 1.9 0.92 4.9 
5 $30.30 1.9 2.0 0.90 5.2 
6 *Number 
obstructed in 
source 
2.0 2.0 0.87 5.2 
7 $40.00 2.2 2.0 0.83 5.6 
8 $48.90 2.3 1.9 0.79 5.9 
9 $68.60 2.6 1.8 0.71 5.9 
10 $164.70 2.7  0.66 6.0 
 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
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Appendix XXIII: Average Number of Persons, Per Household, By Location Type 
(1996 Census): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Secretariat of the Pacific Community, “Fiji: Assessment of Hardship and Poverty,” 
http://www.spc.org.nc/Poverty%20Programme/Fiji%20poverty%20profile.pdf (17 July 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Household Size  5.2 
Urban Area 5.3 
Rural Area 5.0 
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Appendix XXIV: Average Number of Persons, Per Household, by Economic 
Grouping (2002-2003 HIES) 
 
Average Household Size 5.0 
Poor 4.1 
Non-Poor 6.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Secretariat of the Pacific Community, “Fiji: Assessment of Hardship and Poverty,” 
http://www.spc.org.nc/Poverty%20Programme/Fiji%20poverty%20profile.pdf (17 July 2005). 
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Appendix XXV: Urban Household Expenditures 
 
EXPENDITURE 
EXPENDITURE ITEM GROUP 
Number of  
Households 
% Average
Annual 
($)
     
i) Household 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
    
 1. Food, Beverages and Tobacco 3010 99.8 3,141 
 2. Housing Tenure Rents and Other 
Maintenance Costs  
 
2976 
 
98.7 1,883 
 3. Clothing and Footwear 2,290 76.0 517 
 4. Household Equipment and 
Operations 
 
2,779 
 
92.2 
 
428 
 5. Medical Care & Health Services 1,436 47.6 604 
 6. Transport and Communications 2,949 97.8 1,842 
 7. Recreation and Entertainment 1,780 59.0 483 
 8. Education 2,055 68.1 666 
 9. Miscellaneous Goods and Services 2,894 96.0 1,511 
 10. Total Consumption Expenditure 3,015 100.0 10,062 
ii) Household non-
consumption 
expenditure 
    
 1. Insurance Premiums, Social Security 
Contribution, Direct Taxes etc. 
 
 
1,323 
 
 
43.9 
 
 
1,399 
 2. Investments (purchase of land, 
houses, shares, etc. 
 
414 
 
13.7 
 
7,677 
 Total Non Consumption Expenditure 
1,479 49.1 3,400 
iii) Total  3,015 100.0 11,730 
Source: T.I. Bainimarama, “Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2002-03: Provisional 
Results,” Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, 18 December 2003, (Government Printer, Suva) 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/HIES/HIESProvisionRelease.doc, (2 June 2005), 6. 
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Appendix XXVI: Consumption Patterns, by Decile Grouping 
 
D   E   C   I   L   E                 G   R   O   U   P CONSUMPTION 
EXPENDITURE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
 
48.0 
 
43.4 
 
42.5 
 
40.2 
 
38.2 
 
38.3 
 
33.9 
 
30.6 
 
27.6 
 
19.4 
 
31.2 
Tenure, Rents and 
Other 
Maintenance 
Costs 
 
 
20.5 
 
 
19.5 
 
 
18.6 
 
 
18.9 
 
 
19.0 
 
 
18.0 
 
 
19.0 
 
 
18.5 
 
 
16.9 
 
 
18.8 
 
 
18.5 
Clothing and 
Footwear 
 
3.0 
 
3.6 
 
3.6 
 
4.0 
 
3.9 
 
3.5 
 
4.4 
 
3.8 
 
4.5 
 
3.6 
 
3.9 
Household 
Equipment and 
Operations 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
4.0 
 
 
3.9 
 
 
4.0 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
3.9 
Medical Care and 
Health Services 
 
2.2 
 
1.9 
 
1.9 
 
2.1 
 
2.5 
 
2.3 
 
2.6 
 
2.5 
 
2.2 
 
4.5 
 
2.9 
Transport and 
Communications 
 
13.1 
 
16.2 
 
16.2 
 
16.4 
 
17.7 
 
18.0 
 
18.0 
 
19.1 
 
18.3 
 
18.6 
 
17.9 
Recreation and 
Entertainment 
 
0.6 
 
1.2 
 
1.6 
 
1.8 
 
2.1 
 
2.4 
 
2.5 
 
3.4 
 
3.6 
 
3.6 
 
2.8 
 
Education 
 
2.9 
 
3.2 
 
3.4 
 
3.3 
 
3.8 
 
3.5 
 
3.8 
 
4.4 
 
5.8 
 
5.5 
 
4.5 
 
Miscellaneous 
Goods and 
Services 
 
 
6.0 
 
 
7.3 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
9.4 
 
 
8.8 
 
 
10.0 
 
 
12.0 
 
 
13.7 
 
 
16.3 
 
 
22.5 
 
 
14.4 
Source: T.I. Bainimarama, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, “Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2002-03: Provisional Results,” 18 December 2003, (Government Printer, Suva), 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/HIES/HIESProvisionRelease.doc, (2 June 2005), 6. 
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Appendix XXVII: Expenditure by Income Grouping 
I N C O M E    CLASS  Expenditure 
Class Less 
2,000 
2001-
5000 
5001-
7500 
7501-
10000
10001-
15000 
15001-
20000 
20001-
30000 
30001+ Total 
Less 2,000 44 56 6      106 
2001-5000  297 187 89 45    618 
5001-7500   271 171 141 33 8  624 
7501-10000    188 200 65 23 10 486 
10001-15000     263 153 78 26 520 
15001-20000      126 111 31 268 
20001-30000       123 99 222 
30001+        171 171 
Total 44 353 464 448 649 377 343 337 3015 
Source: T.I. Bainimarama, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, “Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2002-03: Provisional Results,” 18 December 2003, (Government Printer, Suva), 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/HIES/HIESProvisionRelease.doc,  (2 June 2005), 6. 
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Appendix XXVIII: Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre Client Statistics- Suva Branch 
 
New and Repeat Domestic Violence Cases 
Seen from 1993 - May 2005 
YEAR NEW REPEAT TOTAL 
1993 241 273 514 
1994 257 488 745 
1995 331 670 1001 
1996 469 728 1197 
1997 405 637 1042 
1998 484 980 1464 
1999 544 724 1268 
2000 338 348 686 
2001 449 391 840 
2002 429 377 806 
2003 394 448 842 
2004 572 472 1044 
May-05 224 179 403 
TOTAL 5137 6715 11852 
Source: Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre, “Suva Branch Client Statistics,” 
http://www.fijiwomen.com/index.php?id=1317  (2 July 2005). 
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Appendix XXIX: Access to TVs, Radios and the Internet in Fiji 
 
Source: Philip Cass, “Media Ownership in the Pacific: Inherited colonial commercial model but 
remarkably diverse,” Pacific Journalism Review Vol. 10 No. 2 (2004), 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/November/pjr10_2.pdf, (30 March 2005), 88. 
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Appendix XXX: Average weekly household income by ethnic group ($F) 
Decile Ethnic Indian Ethnic Fijian 
1 32.40 38.10 
2 60.80 67.60 
3 81.60 89.50 
4 101.50 107.90 
5 124.20 126.70 
6 152.50 147.80 
7 186.70 175.30 
8 240.60 217.60 
9 327.90 288.50 
10 (richest) 914.40 537.10 
Source:  Ganesh Chand, “Overview of Current Economic Conditions in Fiji,” Global Policy Network, 
http://www.gpn.org/data/fiji/fiji-analysis.doc, (5 July 2005), 15. 
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Appendix XXXI: The basic Needs Poverty Line by Area, 1990-1991 
 Minimum Gross Household 
Income Required to meet 
basic needs each week (F$) 
Per cent of the population 
earning less than the 
poverty line 
National 83.00 25.5 
Urban 100.08 27.6 
Rural Village 75.44 22.4 
Rural Settlement 84.10 26.2 
Fijian 92.63 27.7 
Indo-Fijian 97.34 31.0 
Others 92.63 27.6 
Source: United Nations Development Fund, “The Fiji Poverty Study,” 
http://www.undp.org.fj/poverty/poverty_study.htm  (18 July 2005). 
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